Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions by Bell, Abraham & Parchomovsky, Gideon
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2008 
Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions 
Abraham Bell 
Bar-Ilan University 
Gideon Parchomovsky 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Economic Theory Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law 
Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bell, Abraham and Parchomovsky, Gideon, "Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions" (2008). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 172. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/172 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
File: 3 - Bell-Parchomovsky Final 0904 Created on: 9/4/2008 6:55:00 PM Last Printed: 10/1/2008 5:26:00 PM 
1015 
ARTICLES  
 
Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions 
Abraham Bell† & Gideon Parchomovsky†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Every property problem spans three distinct dimensions: number 
of owners, scope of each owner’s dominion, and asset design. These 
three basic dimensions can be traced back to Blackstone’s famous 
encapsulation of property law as the “sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the uni-
verse.”
1
 Blackstone described the optimal dominion as absolute (“sole 
and despotic dominion”), the ideal number of owners as one (“a sin-
gle man”), and the subject matter of property rights to be very broad 
(“over the external things of the world”).
2
 
Blackstone’s description has proved a durable—albeit inaccu-
rate—reference point for property theorists,
3
 who have directed their 
attention to each of the three dimensions identified by Blackstone—
dominion, ownership, and asset—in descending order of importance. 
As any first-year student knows, modern theorists have savaged 
the idea of “absolute dominion”
4
 and tend, instead, to view property as 
a “bundle of rights,”
5
 with no single, fixed “ownership right.”
6
 Rather, 
                                                                                                                      
 † Visiting Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Lecturer, Bar Ilan University, 
Faculty of Law. 
 †† Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor, Bar Ilan University, 
Faculty of Law. This Article greatly benefited from comments and criticisms by Ben Depoorter, 
Lee Anne Fennell, Mark Fenster, Sonia Katyal, Jim Krier, Tom Merrill, Adam Mossoff, Dan Richman, 
Ed Rock, Carol Rose, Chris Serkin, Peter Siegelman, Henry Smith, Phil Weiser, and participants in 
the 2007 Property Works in Progress Conference at the University of Colorado Law School. 
 1 William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England *2 (Chicago 1979).  
 2 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315, 1362–63 (1993) (enumerat-
ing the Blackstonian package of private entitlements).  
 3 See, for example, id (relating the evolution of standard land interests to the Blackstonian ideal). 
 4 See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 Yale L J 601, 612 
(1998) (referring to the “exclusive dominion” view of property as “artificial”); Bruce A. Ackerman, 
Private Property and the Constitution 26 (Yale 1977) (“[First-year property students] learn that only 
the ignorant think it meaningful to talk about owning things free and clear of further obligation.”). 
 5 See generally James E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L 
Rev 711 (1996). See also Ackerman, Private Property at 26 (cited in note 4) (explaining that 
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each right, power, privilege, or duty is but one stick in the total bun-
dle.
7
 The ideal of property as driving toward a single owner fared much 
better and continues to enjoy a pride of place in contemporary property 
theory.
8
 “Things,” the third predicate of the Blackstonian edifice, has 
received the least attention. Primarily, modern scholars have challenged 
the idealized concept along two axes. First, they have questioned the 
exclusive focus on tangible goods as the subject matter of property, 
pointing out that intangible assets, such as intellectual works, may also 
be subject to private property rights.
9
 Second, in Anglo-American law, 
even when tangible objects are concerned, property rights attach to 
reified estates rather than the thing itself. Thus, properly understood, an 
owner does not own land but rather a fee simple absolute (or some 
other estate) in land.
10
 Yet, property theory is still searching for an accu-
rate means of conveying the “‘thingness’ of private property.”
11
 
In this Article, we argue that the idealized Blackstonian charac-
terization led many subsequent scholars astray: although Blackstone 
                                                                                                                      
property law “considers the way rights to use things may be parceled out amongst a host of 
competing resource users”). 
 6 A.M. Honore famously produced a list of no less than eleven “leading incidents” of 
property ownership. A.M. Honore, Ownership, in A.G. Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
107, 113 (Oxford 1961).  
 7 See generally, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 
Neb L Rev 730 (1998) (arguing that while property owners enjoy a varied package of legal rights, 
the right to exclude is both necessary and sufficient for identifying the existence of property).  
 8 Without specific reference to Blackstone, Harold Demsetz’s classic Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights posited that the law creates property rights over an object in order to allow a 
single owner to internalize the various externalities associated with that object. See generally 
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (1967). Demsetz’s 
insight about the centrality of a single owner as a means for internalizing externalities was fur-
ther developed by scholars such as Richard Epstein, Michael Heller, and Francesco Parisi. See 
Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald 
Coase, 36 J L & Econ 553, 562–63 (1993) (stating that concentrating all the incidents of owner-
ship in a single person minimizes the transaction costs of reallocating property to its best use); 
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-commons: Property in Transition from Marx to Mar-
kets, 111 Harv L Rev 621, 631 (1998) (arguing that in regimes transitioning from socialism to 
private markets, the resources that emerge as private property most successfully are those that 
begin the transition with a near-standard bundle of rights assigned to a single person); Francesco 
Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 Am J Comp L 595, 613–17 (2002) (discussing legal mechanisms 
that promote reunification of fragmented property in a single owner). 
 9 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 Harv J 
L & Pub Policy 108, 118 (1990) (arguing that, except in the rarest case, the law should treat intel-
lectual and tangible property identically). But see Mark R. Patterson, When Is Property Intellec-
tual? The Leveraging Problem, 73 S Cal L Rev 1133, 1138–39 (2000) (discussing special antitrust 
difficulties presented by intellectual property).
 
 10 See Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in John Brewer and Susan Staves, eds, 
Early Modern Conceptions of Property 95, 100 (Routledge 1995) (critically discussing the historic 
process of reification by which estates became independent assets subject to ownership). 
 11 Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 Yale L J 1163, 1193 (1998) 
(identifying the bundle-of-legal-relations metaphor as a weak portrayal of the “thingness” of 
private property). 
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correctly identified the building blocks of property law, property law 
does not and cannot achieve the Blackstonian ideal.
12
 The key to this 
paradox is to be found in the fact that property law cannot be ex-
plained by scholarly investigations that isolate one of the three Black-
stonian factors from the others.
13
  
Property puzzles can rarely be understood using one-dimensional 
analysis. The ideals of a single owner, full dominion, and optimal assets 
often conflict among themselves. Thus, property law must on many 
occasions compromise its pursuit of one of the ideals for the other. 
Rules that drive toward creating the ideal number of owners must 
interact with rules seeking to create or preserve the ideal asset size 
together with the ideal package of legal powers and rights. Overlook-
ing one of the dimensions leads to an incomplete, and often distorted, 
view of the field. Unfortunately, there has been no systematic three-
dimensional analysis of property rules.  
The goal of this Article is to develop a comprehensive under-
standing of property law by conceptualizing it as a three-dimensional 
balancing act. Viewing property in this light yields several important 
contributions to the burgeoning literature on property theory. 
First, a three-dimensional conceptualization offers a far more var-
ied picture than is commonly acknowledged. As needs change along 
one or more of the axes—owner, dominion, or asset—the overall con-
cept of the property right must be adjusted accordingly in order to 
maintain maximum benefit from property rights. Consequently, when 
the law pushes for the Blackstonian ideal of absolute dominion of a 
single owner over things, it inexorably finds itself drawn into a more 
compromised stance. Property law, therefore, is a balancing act: as prop-
erty rights fall out of sync on one dimension, the law must adjust its pro-
tections on other dimensions in order to maximize property rights. We 
demonstrate the importance of this general theoretical insight by illus-
trating how a three-dimensional perspective challenges conventional 
understanding of such property issues as appropriation rules, commons 
property, fragmentation of rights, nuisance, and land assembly.  
                                                                                                                      
 12 It is important to note that Blackstone himself acknowledged the complexity of prop-
erty notwithstanding the idealized conception. In this sense, what is referred to as the Blacksto-
nian conception of property is a misnomer. Consider Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1362–63 & n 237 
(cited in note 2) (summarizing what has subsequently become known as the “Blackstonian Bun-
dle of Rights” but immediately admitting that this characterization “is most uncharitable to 
Blackstone,” who recognized many of the complexities and nuances of property law). 
 13 An important precursor to our Article is Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-dimensional Framework 
for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 UC Davis L Rev 813 (2003), which examined two of 
the three dimensions: owner and dominion. 
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Second, the perspective we develop in this Article illuminates six 
strategies property law employs to diffuse the tension among its con-
stitutive dimensions. These six strategies are as follows:  
Fictional owners. In order to maintain some of the advantages of 
having a single owner even though there are multiple individuals who 
actually own rights, the law often concentrates ownership in assets in a 
single fictional owner. The most outstanding example of this is corpo-
rate-owned property. Other instances include partnerships, decedents’ 
estates, and married couples. 
Fictional assets. A second strategy is the creation of fictional as-
sets, so as to slice up a “thing” into pieces small enough to be amena-
ble to full dominion by a single owner. This strategy lies behind the 
reification of property rights and explains why the law insists upon 
ownership of estates (such as fees simple) rather than land or chattels. 
The use of this fiction enables a single owner of a future interest and a 
single owner of a present interest to each enjoy relatively uncompro-
mised dominion (subject only to the rules of waste) over full and sep-
arate—albeit fictional—assets. 
Forced reconfiguration. This strategy primarily involves rules forc-
ing owners to relinquish fractional property interests to a single owner. 
Examples include partition by sale, the (infamous) Rule against Perpe-
tuities, disentailing, and, most importantly, takings by eminent domain 
for purposes of land assembly. In cases of land assembly, takings allow 
the government to simultaneously change the number of owners (typi-
cally to one) and the asset size (typically to a larger asset).
14
 
Limits on owner-initiated reconfiguration or size. In order to pre-
serve ideal asset size or configuration, the law often confines the abil-
ity of an owner to change the size of her real estate parcel without the 
state’s permission. For example, zoning regulations limit the ability of 
a lot owner to divide it physically into smaller lots without permission 
to parcelize from local authorities.
15
 
                                                                                                                      
 14 Takings may also be employed to force an owner of an interest in a large asset to divide 
the asset to permit the creation of single owners over each of the smaller assets. Such was the 
case in Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229 (1984), where legislation forced owners 
to sell fee simple interests, through intermediaries, to their tenants in order to combat the prob-
lem of excessively concentrated land ownership in Hawaii. See id at 232–34.  
 15 See Kenneth H. Young, 4 Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 25.03 at 284–89 (Clark 
Boardman Callaghan 4th ed 1997) (discussing the objectives of subdivision controls). Sometimes 
the restriction is imposed on metaphysical, rather than physical, alterations, as evidenced by the 
numerus clausus principle that prevents individuals from creating new property rights. A variant 
on this strategy, which we may label “forced presentism,” curbs or eliminates the owner’s power 
to interfere with future owners’ dominion over an asset. Thus, the law prevents unreasonable 
restraints on alienation and discharges servitudes in light of changed circumstances. Some appli-
cations of the doctrine of waste also employ forced presentism. These rules preserve as close to 
full dominion as possible over time. 
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Transfer or elimination of elements of dominion. The goal of this 
strategy is to restrict the dominion of the owner in possession by either 
transferring certain rights or privileges to others or by eliminating them 
altogether. It enables lawmakers to hold asset size or configuration con-
stant, while compromising the owner’s dominion. The traditional example 
is the doctrine of waste, which restricted the tenant in possession from 
using the property to the detriment of other co-owners.
16
 Modern exam-
ples of this strategy include conservation easements, which transfer to a 
third party control over certain environmental amenities on private land 
without depriving the owner of her fee simple, and use restrictions in zon-
ing laws, which eliminate certain use privileges from the owner’s domain.  
Differential acquisition rules. A final strategy polices the degree 
and timing of privatization of assets. Thus, some resources are subject 
to a rule of capture, encouraging rapid assimilation into the domain of 
private property; others are subject to rules such as reasonable use or 
public trust that prevent full transition to private property. This strat-
egy enables policymakers to keep certain assets’ characteristics sub-
ject to other nonprivate property regimes. 
We show that the entire law of property can be organized around 
these six reconciliatory strategies. Hence, we offer a clear and coher-
ent way of understanding property law in its entirety. 
Our final contribution is normative. We draw on these strategies 
to craft new solutions to longstanding property puzzles. For example, 
consider some of the examples of excessive “fragmentation” of prop-
erty discussed by Michael Heller
17
 and Francesco Parisi.
18
 These in-
clude such situations as traditional Native American tribal lands. In 
order to keep ownership of land within the tribe, federal law imposed 
restrictions on the alienability of tribal members-owners’ property 
interests. After a few generations, tribal land holdings were character-
ized by a plethora of owners with extremely small and undivided 
shares, which led to underuse and abandonment.
19
 Both Heller and 
Parisi pointed out excessive fragmentation of property interests leads 
                                                                                                                      
 16 Other legal mechanisms employed to this end include trusts, some kinds of servitudes, 
and many kinds of zoning or environmental laws. We include trusts in this category even though 
we acknowledge that, in some respects, trusts also fall under the category of fictional owners, as 
well as having characteristics of fictional assets. 
 17 See Heller, 111 Harv L Rev at 679–87 (cited in note 8) (introducing and discussing “the 
tragedy of the anticommons,” which results in the underuse of resources).  
 18 See Parisi, 50 Am J Comp L at 599–600, 626–27 (cited in note 8).  
 19 Hodel v Irving, 481 US 704, 707–08 (1987) (discussing the process by which “40-, 80-, and 
160-acre parcels became splintered into multiple undivided interests in land, with some parcels 
having hundreds, and many parcels having dozens, of owners”). 
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to too many undivided interests in an asset.
20
 Focusing their attention 
on that dimension alone, each of them argued that the solution should 
focus on limiting fragmentation or forcing aggregation.  
Once one views the problem, as we do, as spanning three dimen-
sions, innovative solutions come to light. For instance, rather than at-
tempt to aggregate the asset held by multiple owners, one may utilize 
a strategy of creating a fictional owner, such as a tribal cooperative, 
with tribal member-owners exchanging their undivided fractional in-
terests in the land for shares in the cooperative. Alternatively, one 
might create a tribal trust to manage the land with tribal members 
retaining undivided fractional beneficial interests. Finally, policymak-
ers might consider making the land freely alienable and formalizing 
limited nonpossessory tribal rights to protect traditional land uses.
21
 
Likewise, consider the example of eminent domain. Eminent do-
main is frequently analyzed in the context of land assembly; indeed, 
some scholars view land assembly as the quintessential and perhaps 
only legitimate justification for the eminent domain power.
22
 Eminent 
domain is justified in the case of land assembly as the necessary solu-
tion for strategic holdouts that may prevent the state from aggregating 
a number of smaller parcels in order to provide a public good with the 
new, assembled parcel. A three-dimensional analysis recognizes that the 
problem may be viewed in several ways: too many owners, too small 
assets, or too much dominion (power to hold out). Holdout problems 
may be resolved, therefore, along all three dimensions. As we explain in 
detail in Part IV, instead of using eminent domain to aggregate the as-
sets, the state can aggregate the owners, as it does in forced pooling ar-
rangements in oil and gas law.
23
 Or, it may change the acquisition rules 
to permit would-be assemblers to force sales for certain uses.
24
 
Structurally, the Article unfolds in four Parts. Part I introduces a 
theoretical framework for understanding the interplay of the three 
dimensions of property. In particular, we show that both private actors 
in the marketplace and policymakers defining property rights must 
aim at maximizing property value as a function of three variables. Part 
II of the Article reviews current scholarship of property with an eye 
toward teasing out doctrines where analysis has been led astray by 
                                                                                                                      
 20 See Heller, 111 Harv L Rev at 685–87 (cited in note 8); Parisi, 50 Am J Comp L at 599–600, 
626–27 (cited in note 8). 
 21 See Part IV.A. 
 22 See, for example, Michael Heller and Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 Harv L 
Rev 1465, 1467 (2008). 
 23 See Part IV.D. 
 24 See Abraham Bell, Private Takings 33–37 (unpublished manuscript, 2007) (discussing 
government-mediated private takings in which the government uses its eminent domain power 
to allow private actors to seize property). 
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failing to take account of all three dimensions of property. In each 
case, we examine the interplay of the three dimensions of property 
and show why property doctrines must take account of all three di-
mensions at once. Part III elaborates the strategies actually employed 
by the law to deal with the uneasily reconciled needs of value maximi-
zation along three dimensions and maps these strategies onto current 
doctrine. Part IV presents normative suggestions, demonstrating that 
many of the three-dimensional strategies of property policymakers 
may be used in new contexts.  
I.  ORDERING PROPERTY IN THREE DIMENSIONS 
Property is always a three-dimensional puzzle, comprising own-
ers, assets, and dominion. Property is three-dimensional not only in the 
private realm, where people have to consider how to allocate their 
rights over assets, but also in the public realm where government must 
create and police legal property forms to meet private needs.  
To illustrate, consider one of the most basic problems of property 
law: what to do when owners of property in common decide to part ways. 
The law formally recognizes two basic options. One is to preserve the 
owners’ identities and divide the asset among the different owners. The 
other is to maintain the asset’s unity and change the identity of the own-
er(s) by selling the asset and dividing the proceeds. The law labels these 
two options “partition in kind” and “partition by sale” respectively.
25
 In 
truth, however, the choice standing before a judge is not binary. 
In addition to the two recognized options, courts have the possibil-
ity of holding both asset unity and owner identity constant, while 
adjusting the rights (or dominion) of the owners. While the law has no 
formal label for this option, courts have already made decisions of this 
type. This, for example, was the course chosen by the Surrogate’s Court 
in In re McDowell,
26
 where the disputants were siblings arguing about 
the ownership of their deceased father’s old rocking chair.
27
 The court 
ruled that, as heirs, the siblings each owned a share in the chair and that 
the two would have to trade off possession of the chair every six months.
28
 
In other words, the court rejected the traditional owner-oriented and as-
set-oriented resolutions of partition problems and instead invented one 
oriented toward dominion through forced time-sharing. 
                                                                                                                      
 25 See Richard R. Powell, 7 Powell on Real Property § 50.07[4]–[5] at 50-47 to 50-51 (Mat-
thew Bender 2007) (Michael Allan Wolf, ed).  
 26 345 NYS2d 828 (Sur Ct 1973). 
 27 See id at 829. 
 28 See id at 830 (failing to address the issue as one of partition but rather describing it as 
one of resolving ownership). 
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We argue that it is not surprising that, in resolving partition dis-
putes, courts may act along one or more of three axes: owner, asset, or 
dominion. Three-dimensionality is the defining characteristic of prop-
erty rights. As such, any definition or adjustment of property rights 
necessarily involves a puzzle of maximizing value as a function of 
three variables. 
In this Part, we demonstrate and justify the ubiquity of three-
dimensional concerns in the law of property. We claim that the impor-
tance of the three concerns and the tensions among them stem from 
the very nature of property. We discuss this claim from two divergent 
vantage points: private ordering and public ordering of property re-
gimes. We show that both the private and public order continuously 
shuffle property rights and forms to maximize value in light of the con-
cerns of owner, asset, and dominion. 
A. Three-dimensional Property Basics  
Before embarking on our examination of how private parties and 
lawmakers order property rights in three dimensions, we begin with 
the simple observation that the definition of property rights must, by 
its nature, involve delineation along the three dimensions of owner, 
asset, and dominion. Consider, for example, the heart of Harold Dem-
setz’s famous analysis in Toward a Theory of Property Rights.
29
 Dem-
setz sought to explain how property rights naturally evolve whenever 
a scarce resource becomes valuable, and he illustrated his thesis by de-
scribing the emergence of property rights in land—specifically, in hunt-
ing territories in Canada’s Labrador Peninsula. According to Demsetz, 
private property rights emerged when it became sufficiently valuable to 
those concerned to internalize benefits and costs.
30
 
This internalization can be accomplished only by specifying own-
er, asset, and dominion. The property right must specify the owner (in 
whom the benefits and costs are internalized), the territory over which 
this ownership extends, and the rights included in ownership. Indeed, 
it is impossible to conceive of allocating property without specifying 
all three aspects of ownership. There cannot be ownership in land 
without some clear idea of who owns the land, what land is owned, 
and what rights accrue to the owner as a result of her status.
31
 
                                                                                                                      
 29 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (1967). 
 30 See id at 354. 
 31 Admittedly, one might conceive of another dimension of property specification: time. 
However, as our example demonstrates, durability of property rights is easily accommodated 
within the dimensions of asset and dominion. 
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Like most writers, Demsetz assumed, without ever stating so ex-
plicitly, that the typical property right partakes of the Blackstonian ideal 
of a single owner with absolute dominion (full internalization) over a 
thing. In the example of the hunting grounds, this entails a single person 
owning a marked-off area and having absolute rights over the area, in-
cluding, most importantly, exclusion and use rights. The Blackstonian 
ideal therefore serves as the idealized goal of property definition. 
Upon further analysis, however, the surface attractiveness of the 
Blackstonian ideal breaks down. The goal of providing a single owner 
with absolute dominion over a thing often proves unreachable, leaving 
owners and the policymakers the challenge of maximizing property 
value as a function of three variables that do not always move in a 
correlated fashion. 
Consider, for example, the management of property rights in a 
beautifully designed residential home. One might suspect that optimal 
production of such homes would be achieved by defining legal prop-
erty rights in such homes in absolute Blackstonian fashion, permitting 
the potential builder of such a home to internalize all utility created 
by such a home, thereby allowing the builder to calculate whether to 
make the investment based on full internalized enjoyment and cost. 
However, this initial impulse is probably wrong. The house will 
almost certainly last beyond the lifetime of the builder, and the beauty 
will almost certainly be enjoyed, at least in part, by passersby with 
whom the builder will have no practical ability to bargain for inter-
nalization. This means that the utility of the home will certainly spill 
over to nonowners. In particular, the utility enjoyed by the builder-
owner from the asset will necessarily end at her death; she may only 
enjoy vicarious utility from the anticipation of her heirs’ or grantees’ 
enjoyment. In this example, as in many others, the Blackstonian model 
of property rights cannot possibly create full internalization. 
The optimal definition of property rights must compromise be-
tween the impulse to concentrate the property right in the hands of one 
person—here the builder-owner—and the contrary impulse to divide 
the property rights among those who will necessarily enjoy at least part 
of the benefit of the “thing” in question—the home. Optimization of 
property rights requires compromise upon at least one dimension. 
Property rights may be adjusted along any or all three of the di-
mensions. The beautiful home with spillovers may be placed under the 
ownership of the builder and passersby. The builder may be left with 
full ownership of part of the building but be stripped of ownership of 
the exterior (ownership of which might be handed over to passersby). 
Or, most likely, both the ownership and asset configuration may be 
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left intact, while some of the owner’s dominion rights to alter the 
building’s exterior are stripped away.
32
 
Where asset reconfiguration is difficult, compromises in owner-
ship structure or owner dominion are likely strategies. Consider, for 
example, Robert Ellickson’s examination of ownership structures in 
land. As Ellickson notes, scale efficiencies vary for assets among dif-
ferent uses and users: 
For example, . . . the optimal territorial scale of the Coase College 
campus, given its educational purposes, is 200 acres. But the opti-
mal scale for exploitation of the oil pool beneath Coase is 7777 
acres. And when Coase rents living space to a sophomore, an 
optimal space is a[n] . . . interest in a 150-square-foot dormitory 
room.
33
 Aggregation and disaggregation of parcels in order to permit each use 
as it becomes most efficient is not an easy matter. Moreover, most lands 
have multiple simultaneous uses, meaning that for many purposes a 
parcel size is suboptimal or supraoptimal for one particular use while 
optimal for another. Sometimes, the result is various kinds of collective 
ownership, such as kibbutzim.
34
 More often, the problems in asset size 
are dealt with through compromised rights as embodied in zoning law. 
However, the reification of property rights in Anglo-American 
law means that, even in realty, asset configuration often plays a special 
role in optimizing value given tensions along property’s three dimen-
sions. While it is not easy physically to divide a home so as to provide 
for different ownership of different rooms, it is less difficult to divide 
abstract estates in land. For instance, the physical home may remain 
intact while the abstract legal asset (that is, the fee simple) is divided 
into two: a life estate and a remainder. This means that, in Anglo-
American law, asset reconfiguration often proves a better means of 
maximizing property value than aggregating ownership or reducing the 
package of ownership rights.
35
 
                                                                                                                      
 32 See, for example, United States v Blackman, 613 SE2d 442, 444–45 (Va 2005) (concerning 
a servitude forcing the owner of a historical home to preserve its appearance). 
 33 Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1332–33 (cited in note 2). 
 34 See id at 1347–48. 
 35 Reification of rights, together with a post-Hohfeldian view of property rights as a “bun-
dle of sticks,” poses a challenge for those examining the three dimensions of property. Specifi-
cally, if property is merely a collection of owner rights—dominion, in our terminology—what 
does it mean to speak of a property “asset”? The answer is that even when the defined property 
asset is purely an abstraction, it is still conceived of as distinct from the dominion over it. For 
instance, if the property right consists of a right to profit from an idea, the idea is the asset; and 
the profit right, the dominion. Property rules always partake of distinct dimensions of dominion 
and asset because they are rights in rem. Thus, even if the protected res is merely abstract, it must 
be defined or conceived of in some fashion before one can proceed to defining the rights com-
prising owner dominion. 
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B. Three Dimensions of Private Ordering of Property 
Private property owners work to maximize property value as a 
function of three dimensions through contract. The importance of the 
ownership-asset-dominion triangle in contractual arrangements is a 
central theme in the property rights writings of Yoram Barzel (albeit 
without explicit acknowledgement of the role of any of the three di-
mensions).
36
 Barzel sought to elaborate a model of the development of 
what he termed “economic property rights” through contractual ar-
rangements that exploit changes in private cost functions. Barzel’s 
theory focuses on how private parties allocate property rights through 
contract and other arrangements.
37
 While his work centers on value 
allocation, a careful examination of the model reveals that, in Barzel’s 
world, private parties take advantage of the three dimensions of own-
er, asset, and dominion in defining their property rights.
38
 
For example, Barzel observed that gas station owners responded 
to changes in gasoline prices following conflicts in the Middle East not 
only by rationing supplies according to waiting times in queue
39
 but 
also by reconfiguring the asset sold. Deprived of the ability to reprice 
the asset on account of price controls, station owners altered the asset 
sold by reducing the quality of gasoline (measured by octane rating) 
and stripped away auxiliary services previously bundled with the gaso-
                                                                                                                      
 36 See Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 33 (Cambridge 2d ed 1997). 
 37 See id at 33–54 (using the tenant-farmer–landlord relationship as an example of how 
parties will maximize value by shifting contract form). 
 38 Barzel’s concept of property rights differs significantly from that generally embraced by 
legal scholars and therefore requires some initial explanation. In contrast with the theories dis-
cussed in the previous Part, Barzel’s theory views property as a post hoc description of the ability to 
enjoy value from a given service or asset. Notably, this description of property differs from a legal 
package of rights or even a legal recognition of the ability to enjoy value. See id at 3. See also 
Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 
111 Yale L J 357, 358 (2001): 
[U]pon closer inspection, all this property-talk among legal economists is not about any dis-
tinctive type of right. To [ ] a greater extent than even the legal scholars, modern economists 
assume that property consists of an ad hoc collection of rights in resources. Indeed, there is 
a tendency among economists to use the term property “to describe virtually every de-
vice—public or private, common-law or regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or 
informal—by which divergences between private and social costs or benefits are reduced.”  
Quoting Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 53 (Aspen 5th ed 1998). The touchstone 
of Barzel’s analysis is transaction cost economics as pioneered by Ronald Coase. In relevant part, 
this branch of economics treats legal entitlements as unimportant so long as transaction costs are 
sufficiently small. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 1–15 (1960). Thus, 
Barzel had good reason to relegate questions of legal property to a secondary role in his investi-
gation. Nonetheless, Barzel’s discussion of property rights is valuable in delineating the interplay 
of the dimensions of property as understood by more traditional property scholarship. 
 39 See Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights at 24 (cited in note 36) (explaining 
that by setting a price ceiling below the market-clearing price, a part of the rights to the gasoline 
was placed in the public domain and could be acquired by buyers who joined the queue). 
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line.
40
 Barzel similarly noted that assets conveyed in labor contracts
41
 
and realty rentals,
42
 and also asset and risk allocations such as insur-
ance contracts,
43
 were altered over time by the markets or by changes 
in production and cost functions, whether due to regulation, improved 
production techniques, or other developments. 
Barzel also analyzed changes in ownership configurations in re-
sponse to production functions by examining the role of corporations,
44
 
split control through leaseholds,
45
 and other cooperative mechanisms
46
 in 
the efficient exploitation of economic property rights. Barzel followed 
Ronald Coase in viewing both property rights and organizational forms 
as fundamental questions of transaction costs.
47
 However, Barzel re-
versed Coase’s order of priority by describing organizational forms as 
seen through the lens of economic property rights. Barzel’s theory 
sees sole ownership as an ideal that reduces transaction costs, but only 
at the cost of decreasing the ability to specialize. Thus, ownership con-
figurations, according to Barzel, aim to obtain the benefits of specializa-
tion by slicing up attributes of property so as to enable, as much as pos-
sible, each attribute to belong to a single owner.
48
  
For example, according to Barzel, the purpose of the firm is not to 
divide ownership among many individuals, but rather, to provide a lim-
ited insurance mechanism to each of the individual worker-owners selling 
their output.
49
 Corporations are not simply a network of contracts;
50
 they 
                                                                                                                      
 40 Id at 27–29. Auxiliary services included pumping gas, washing windows, and checking 
engine oil. 
 41 See id at 78–80 (explaining how contractual arrangements between workers and em-
ployers vary in order to expose each of the parties to different levels of variability). 
 42 See id at 45–49 (discussing how lease contract attributes, such as maintenance responsi-
bilities, are assigned to the party that can better affect the value of the output by manipulating 
that attribute). 
 43 See id at 60–62, 64 (noting that fire insurers are the “efficient owners” of a building’s 
attribute of fire hazard since fire insurers, rather than titleholders, are specialists in minimizing 
fire hazard). 
 44 See id at 65–84. 
 45 See id at 33–54 (“Together owners of labor and owners of land . . . will adopt the con-
tract form that generates the largest net output value.”). 
 46 See id at 55–64 (examining the complex structuring of rights associated with large-scale 
equipment and office buildings). 
 47 See id at 11 (“The presence of positive transaction costs is what makes the study of 
property rights significant.”). 
 48 See id at 51–53. 
 49 See id at 81 (defining the scope of the firm as “the set of contracts whose variability is 
contractually guaranteed by common equity capital”). 
 50 The description of corporations as a network of contracts was proposed by Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling. See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 310–11 
(1976) (describing most organizations as legal fictions, “which serve as a nexus for a set of con-
tracting relationships among individuals” ) (emphasis omitted).  
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are a network of single owners, each selling her property rights, together 
with a network of guarantors providing limited financing.
51
 
Barzel’s analysis is particularly important for our purposes, as it 
comes against Coase’s background view of legal definitions of prop-
erty as of purely secondary importance.
52
 Barzel’s work demonstrates 
that even in the absence of legal restraints, owners and would-be own-
ers constantly juggle their ownership to achieve the optimal combina-
tion of number of owners, asset control, and asset configuration. Dif-
ferent abilities to enjoy profits from specialization, changes in societal 
tastes and technology, changing values of inputs, substitutes and com-
plements, and a host of other factors combine to alter constantly the 
value of ownership. Within the limitations imposed by transaction 
costs, owners respond by altering one or more of the three factors to 
return assets to the most productive use for them. Sometimes owners 
rearrange ownership structures into corporations or other fictional 
forms; sometimes they reconfigure their assets into different bundles; 
sometimes they yield or seize rights of control over their assets. Own-
ers may abandon parts of assets to the public domain in order to pro-
tect more cost-effectively what remains.
53
  
Assume, for example, a large empty tract of land, Largeacre, con-
trolled by Jane. Jane can go about extracting value from Largeacre in 
a variety of ways involving all three dimensions we discuss. She can 
assert sole and complete dominion over the entire tract and use the 
tract herself. She can hire the help of others in order to manage and 
use the land, thereby yielding a certain degree of her dominion over 
the tract. She can add other owners to help her manage and use the 
land by creating a tenancy in common, thereby yielding a certain de-
gree of her dominion over the tract. Alternatively, she can mortgage 
part of the tract in order to raise money that she can then use to im-
prove the land. She can subdivide into multiple lots and sell each of 
the smaller lots to a different single owner. She can set up a corpora-
tion that would own Largeacre and sell shares in the corporation to 
investors. Her decision on this score will involve some juggling of her 
rights, the introduction of other “owners,” and configuring the asset or 
dominion over it, all in order to maximize the value extracted from 
her property rights. In short, in the Barzelian world, “owners” adjust 
                                                                                                                      
 51 Whereas Jensen and Meckling’s theory is referred to as “nexus of contracts,” Barzel 
refers to a firm as a “nexus of outcome guarantees.” Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property 
Rights at 81 (cited in note 36). 
 52 See note 38. 
 53 See generally Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the 
Optimal Value of an Asset, 31 J Legal Stud 339 (2002) (discussing optimizing asset value for 
owners by partial destruction of the asset).  
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their position along all three dimensions in an attempt to maximize 
the value they derive from their assets. 
The case of copyrights in musical compositions provides a real 
world example of three-dimensional adjustment. One of the exclusive 
rights the law grants to copyright owners is the right to perform the 
work in public.
54
 The right to control public performances of musical 
works is a potentially valuable right, but it is notoriously difficult to 
enforce.
55
 Illegal public performances of musical works can occur in 
multiple places at once, often leaving no trace of the infringement af-
ter the fact. These characteristics combine to make it very difficult for 
individual copyright owners to extract the full value embedded in the 
public performance right. The high cost of monitoring illegal perform-
ances and suing putative infringers make enforcement on an individ-
ual basis impractical.  
Copyright owners responded to this challenge by forming per-
formance rights collectives, such as American Society of Composers, 
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc (BMI), 
which manage and enforce public performance rights on a collective 
basis.
56
 Individual owners chose to compromise their dominion by ced-
ing their exclusive control over public performances of their works to 
the aforementioned collectives and accepting in exchange a share of the 
royalties collected by the organizations. Robert Merges described copy-
right owners’ decisions to opt in to a collective management and en-
forcement ownership as a transition from a strong property model, under 
which each owner has full control of her works, to a liability rule model, 
under which copyright owners voluntarily agree to accept the royalties 
determined by their collective of choice.
57
 In our terminology, the copy-
right owners responded to the high cost of enforcing public perform-
ance rights by adjusting their rights on the dominion dimension.
58
  
                                                                                                                      
 54 See 17 USC § 106(4) (2000). 
 55 See, for example, Jay M. Fujitani, Comment, Controlling the Market Power of Performing 
Rights Societies: An Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation, 72 Cal L Rev 103, 105 
(1984) (describing how “[t]he ephemeral nature of public performances [that] made it difficult 
for copyright owners to detect unauthorized performances of their works” led to the creation of 
organizations for the enforcement of performance rights).  
 56 See W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music Copy-
right, 92 Iowa L Rev 835, 844 (2007) (“ASCAP . . . is famous for stories of its employees, cloaked 
in ASCAP-emblazoned jackets, patrolling local concerts, stores, restaurants, and nightclubs in 
search of . . . businesses that perform songs publicly without permission.” ). See also Stanley M. 
Besen, Sheila N. Kirby, and Steven C. Salop, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 Va 
L Rev 383, 385–90 (1992). 
 57 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal L Rev 1293, 1303 (1996). 
 58 An alternative owner-asset adjustment might involve copyright owners transferring the 
copyrights themselves to the collectives. 
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Over time, technology created a new challenge for copyright hold-
ers in musical works: filesharing. The emergence of the internet, to-
gether with email and peer-to-peer applications, greatly increased the 
scope of unlawful exchange and distribution of music files. According to 
some estimates, at the height of the practice, almost one billion files 
were illegally shared every month.
59
  
Copyright owners adopted a two-pronged approach to the new 
challenge. First, the content industry adopted encryption and other 
technological protection measures to make copying more difficult. 
Second, owners of valuable copyright portfolios persuaded Congress 
to pass legislation enhancing the penalties for internet copying and 
barring the circumvention of technological protection measures.
60
 The 
new legislation expanded the powers of copyright holders vis-à-vis 
potential file sharers by making it more difficult and costly for the 
latter to access and use copyrighted content without permission.
61
 
Without the new legislation, the technological self-help measures were 
of limited effectiveness since hackers always found ways to defeat 
them.
62
 By siding with the copyright owners, Congress improved their 
position of the copyright holders in the technological war they were 
waging on hackers and file sharers. In our terms, once again, the legis-
lation adjusted property rights along the dominion dimension. 
But this was not the end of the story. Obviously, the new law 
could not achieve absolute deterrence, and congressional intervention 
was not enough on its own to end illegal filesharing. The ban on circum-
vention has proven to be difficult to enforce and many file sharers have 
                                                                                                                      
 59 See Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, Hearings on S 2560 before the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (2004) (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman 
and CEO, Recording Industry Association of America), online at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
testimony.cfm?id=1276&wit_id=3753 (visited June 8, 2008).  
 60 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 
(1998), codified in relevant part at 17 USC §§ 1201–05 (2000). For a discussion of the content 
industry’s role in the enactment of the DMCA, see Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 122–49 
(Prometheus 2001).  
 61 See Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 Yale L J 1575, 1640 (2002) (pointing out that “[m]ost users have neither the 
inclination nor the ability to circumvent a technical protection measure”). See also Jack Gold-
smith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? 107–25 (Oxford 2006) (describing how the litiga-
tion that marked the demise of Kazaa also meant that file trading groups avoiding government 
detection would be harder to find by ordinary users). 
 62 See, for example, Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 Denver U 
L Rev 13, 23 (2006) (noting that there are “no perfect, hacker-proof” technological protection 
measures); Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act against the 
Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 Loyola LA 
Enter L Rev 635, 638 (2004) (“Proponents of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions were 
not naïve about the technological infallibility of [technical protection measures]. They admit-
ted that no technology would be foolproof against every hacker bent on compromising it.”). 
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not been deterred.
63
 Given the low likelihood of enforcement, internet 
users all over the world deem the cost savings from illegal filesharing 
(forgone expenditures on CDs and the like) greater than the expected 
cost from enhanced legal liability. This has led the music industry to 
reconfigure its most valuable asset—the package by which it delivers 
music (and attendant limited copyright licenses). The dominant pack-
age of prior decades—the music album on vinyl, tape, or CD—is es-
sentially a bundled good.
64
 It typically contains two or three hits and a 
number of track fillers. Traditionally, music lovers had little use for the 
track fillers but put up with them to enjoy the hits with which they 
were bundled.
65
 However, filesharing gave music owners the opportu-
nity to “unbundle” the good and gain direct access to hits they wanted. 
Realizing this, in recent years, the music industry has altered the con-
figuration of the asset by unbundling the package and selling music on 
a per track basis. Online music sites, such as iTunes, sell music by the 
song, affording buyers significant cost savings.
66
 Importantly, the recon-
figuration of the assets lowered the attractiveness of illegal filesharing 
in the United States. And in 2006, “[t]he number of households down-
loading legally almost caught up to the number of homes that down-
load illegally via peer-to-peer . . . file-sharing networks.”
67
 
C. Three Dimensions of Public Ordering of Property 
In the previous Part, we argued that when left to their own de-
vices, private actors will naturally develop property rights that tend to 
maximize value as a function of the three dimensions of ownership, as-
set configuration, and owner dominion. As we demonstrated in the ex-
ample of filesharing, these rearrangements will often involve changes 
in law as well as contractual arrangements. Ideally, lawmakers, too, 
should aim for three-dimensional maximization. While the state is not 
an “efficient” producer of property rights such that one should expect 
the legal market to “clear” at optimal property rights definition, the 
                                                                                                                      
 63 See von Lohmann, 24 Loyola LA Enter L Rev at 639 (cited in note 62) (stating that the 
DMCA anticircumvention provisions have not been of any help to content owners). But see Paul 
Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 UC Davis L Rev 1327, 1398 (2008). 
 64 See Christopher Sprigman, The 99¢ Question, 5 J Telecommun & High Tech L 87, 90–91 
(2006). 
 65 Indeed, track fillers, or filler songs, are often called “throwaways.” Consider Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 BU L Rev 975, 1028 n 193 (2002) 
(suggesting that “a full-length CD consists of four tracks that consumers want and another six to 
eight tracks of filler songs”). 
 66 See, for example, Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-based Digital Rights Management, 5 J Tele-
commun & High Tech L 47, 67 (2006). 
 67 See Joseph Palenchar, NPD: Illegal Downloads Outpacing Legal Downloads, Twice (Mar 
14, 2007), online at http://www.twice.com/article/CA6424429.html (visited June 8, 2008). 
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state often maneuvers to improve property definitions at the request 
of property “consumers” (constituents and lobbyists).
68
 Naturally, le-
gally defined property must take account of all three dimensions.  
To understand how lawmakers define property rights, we first 
seek to ascertain the importance of government definition of property 
rights in light of private autonomy in shaping contractual rights. 
One function of government regulation is illustrated by the ex-
ample of filesharing. State law is a collective action mechanism that in 
some cases proves the most cost-effective way for private individuals 
to arrange their property rights.
69
 Additionally, once government de-
fines property rights, state definitions often take the place of (or re-
duce the price of) private contractual orderings.
70
 After all, why should 
parties to a property contract reinvent the wheel and classify anew 
their rights to utilize a given asset when they may adopt definitions 
already provided by the state? 
A second, more important function of government regulation of 
property rights is to establish rights beyond the contractual scope of 
parties to bargain with another—that is, in those cases where transac-
tion costs bar effective bargaining between all potentially relevant 
parties to ownership. This theme was developed in three interrelated 
articles by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, who sought to explain 
the importance of property law in a post-Coasean world.
71
 Merrill and 
Smith argued that because property rights deal with an indefinitely 
large class of individuals who may encounter a given asset, property 
law is essential for managing the costs of conveying information about 
rights.
72
 Property law accomplishes this by going beyond simply estab-
lishing default rules for contracting parties.
73
 Under the rule of nume-
                                                                                                                      
 68 Rent-seeking is prevalent in the production of legal property rules, as in any other po-
litical activity, and there is no reason to believe therefore that every property change will im-
prove net welfare. Indeed, we discuss a number of badly designed property definitions in Part IV. 
 69 See Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights at 98–104 (cited in note 36) (discuss-
ing the government’s role in delineating property rights through dispute settlement and by plac-
ing assets which are very costly to police into the public domain); Richard A. Epstein, The Allo-
cation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J Legal Stud 515, 518 (2002) (asserting that 
where there is little risk of overuse of a common-pool asset, gains from more efficient allocation 
of the asset may be offset by increases in administrative costs). 
 70 See, for example, Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1368–71 (cited in note 2). 
 71 See generally Merrill and Smith, 111 Yale L J 357 (cited in note 38); Thomas W. Merrill 
and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle, 110 Yale L J 1 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract 
Interface, 101 Colum L Rev 773 (2001). 
 72 See Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 26–27 (cited in note 71) (justifying the numerus 
clausus principle as a means for controlling an “externality involving measurement costs: Parties 
who create new property rights will not take into account the full magnitude of the measurement 
costs they impose on strangers to the title”).  
 73 See Merrill and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 394 (cited in note 38).  
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rus clausus, property law limits the ability of private parties to create 
new property forms contractually.
74
 
Viewed more broadly, Merrill and Smith’s property writings re-
mind us that property rights, as defined by the government, are rights 
in rem, which avail against the world—even those who have not bar-
gained with the defined owner. Because the costs of transacting with 
other potentially affected users of any given asset are often prohibi-
tively high, the public definition of property rights is frequently dispo-
sitive.
75
 This means that while private ordering may determine the 
shape of property rights in instances where the value of the order ex-
ceeds transaction costs (including, but not limited to, the information 
costs described by Merrill and Smith), private parties will often find 
that transaction costs are sufficiently high to bar such ordering. Con-
sequently, for a wide range of potential users or possessors of assets, 
the government definition of property rights is the important one. 
The Blackstonian ideal of property as absolute dominion of a sin-
gle owner over a thing retains broad political appeal, as can be seen in 
such disparate political movements as opposition to eminent domain, 
support for the use of force in defense of property, and demands for 
sharper restrictions on the ability of law enforcement officials to enter 
private homes. At the same time, it must be recognized that property 
rights are not often easily bundled into neat Blackstonian packages. 
Instead, the law must shuffle legal protections in order to maximize 
the value of property rights over time as a function of the three crucial 
elements of assets, unitary ownership, and dominion. This cannot be 
accomplished by stubborn adherence to the Blackstonian ideal, but 
rather by taking account of high transaction costs and expected vari-
ability in tastes and technology, and by defining and redefining prop-
erty rights in order to encourage private management and facilitate 
transferability and specialization. Sometimes, this occurs at the ex-
pense of one or the other of the Blackstonian ideals. 
The goal of government-defined property rights is not to achieve 
optimization in any individual bargain; this task may be left to the in-
dividual contracting parties at hand. Rather, lawmakers ideally define 
property rights in order to achieve optimization in the many cases 
                                                                                                                      
 74 See Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 4 (cited in note 71). 
 75 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L Rev 
531, 533 (2005) (“Because it is practically impossible for contracts to arrange most of society’s 
relationships, property law determines most of the legal interactions regarding assets among 
people.”); Merrill and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 393–94 (cited in note 38) (arguing that if property is 
a bundle of rights, some bundles are much easier to communicate than others and therefore have 
an information-cost advantage). 
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where affected parties cannot bargain due to transaction costs. As with 
private parties, lawmakers must work along all three dimensions.  
Consider again the example of property rights in a durable and 
beautiful house. Not only are many of the beneficiaries of utility from 
the house outside of the reach of potential transactions (due to high 
transaction costs), many are as yet unborn and cannot express any pref-
erences whatsoever. In this case, a single owner of absolute dominion 
over the entire home for eternity may well reconfigure property rights 
in such a manner as to maximize her own utility to society’s aggregate 
loss because the utility of passersby and future generations will be tak-
en into account only to such a degree as the owner can enjoy vicarious 
benefit. For example, the owner may impose a durable burden on title 
in the home that produces a small amount of present psychic enjoyment 
but that places a long-term high cost on the enjoyment of future gen-
erations. Lawmakers can work to counteract such developments by re-
stricting the owner’s ability to reconfigure the asset and compromise 
future owners’ rights by, for example, limiting the ability to impose 
some kinds of restraints on alienability or by enforcement of a numerus 
clausus rule that forbids willy-nilly creation of new estates in land.
76
 
In Part III, we consider more systematically the strategies actually 
used by lawmakers to maximize property value given three-dimensional 
tensions. We argue that, on closer analysis, many of the contours of 
property law can be interpreted as lawmakers’ attempts, for better or 
worse, to juggle the needs of the three dimensions of property. But we 
first demonstrate, in Part II, how lack of attention to the three-
dimensionality of property problems has distorted our understanding 
of central property themes. 
II.  THE MISSING DIMENSIONS OF PROPERTY ANALYSIS 
In this Part, we discuss how the three-dimensionality of property 
manifests itself in numerous doctrines. We illustrate three-dimensionality’s 
importance in understanding the challenges of property law and show 
how insufficient attention to this fact has led renowned property theo-
rists astray. 
A. The “Fragmentation” of Property Rights 
We begin with some of the puzzles recognized in the writings of 
Heller as well as Parisi. In a series of papers, Michael Heller identified a 
problem that he labeled “excessive fragmentation of property rights” 
                                                                                                                      
 76 To be sure, there is no reason to be certain that lawmakers will act correctly in order to 
ensure optimal value preservation for future generations.  
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and, in particular, the problem of anticommons.
77
 In Heller’s account, 
anticommons occur where an asset is shared by too many owners pos-
sessing excessively small asset shares. This over-fragmentation of own-
ership creates a situation where no owner has sufficient power to utilize 
the asset and none has sufficient incentive to jointly manage the asset 
given high transaction costs.
78
 The result is underutilization of property. 
Heller built on this insight to explain and justify several of property’s 
most exotic doctrines. For example, Heller described the “tortuous Rule 
Against Perpetuities” as an attempt to “limit inter-temporal fragmenta-
tion.”
79
 Likewise, he explained the numerus clausus principle that limits 
private creation of new property forms on the same grounds.
80
 
Heller also criticized some property doctrines for opening the 
door to excessive fragmentation. For example, he noted that the law of 
servitudes permits division and allocation of property rights in order to 
encourage “good fragmentation” but cautioned that the law’s flexibility 
might serve as a “one way ratchet,” leading to over-fragmentation, lock-
ing property into suboptimal uses.
81
 This, he said, is a particular danger 
facing common-interest developments (such as condominium build-
ings and gated communities), which deliberately create extensive net-
works of reciprocal servitudes.
82
 
Extending Heller’s analysis, Parisi described the tendency toward 
excessive fragmentation as a one-directional bias towards entropy in 
property.
83
 Parisi argued that the problem might be even more trou-
bling than Heller might have realized, due to asymmetric transaction 
costs: while the cost of dividing property among multiple holders is 
quite low, the cost of reaggregating it is often prohibitive.
84
 
                                                                                                                      
 77 See generally Heller, 111 Harv L Rev 621 (cited in note 8); Heller, 108 Yale L J 1163 
(cited in note 11); Michael A Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 Theoretical 
Inquiries in L 79 (2001) (proposing anticommons as a fourth ideal type of property, to be added 
to the standard trilogy of private, commons, and state property). The concept was first introduced 
by Frank Michelman. See Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in J. 
Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds, NOMOS XXIV: Ethics, Economics, and the Law 3, 6 
(NYU 1982). 
 78 See Heller, 111 Harv L Rev at 633–42 (cited in note 8). 
 79 Heller, 108 Yale L J at 1179 (cited in note 11).  
 80 See id at 1177 (noting how judges reduced the costs of intertemporal fragmentation by 
restricting the fee tail). 
 81 See id at 1183–84 (explaining how fragmenting governance among a group of owners 
may promote good fragmentation), 1165–66 (noting that “[b]ecause of high transaction costs, 
strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases, people may find it easier to divide property than to 
recombine it”). 
 82 See id at 1183–85 (predicting that without the restriction of members’ veto rights, com-
mon-interest communities “may fall further and further behind their productivity frontier”). 
 83 See Parisi, 50 Am J Comp L at 626–27 (cited in note 8).  
 84 See id at 627. For other discussions of the fragmentation problem in property, see gener-
ally Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw U L Rev 907 (2004); Reza Dibadj, 
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By our lights, the important contributions of Heller and Parisi fall 
short of their full potential by paying insufficient attention to the 
three-dimensionality of property. As their terminology suggests, both 
tend to view asset size as a given and focus on the number and type of 
ownership shares.
85
 Thus, each focuses on the danger of excessive 
fragmentation of ownership while failing to notice that in some cases 
the law must encourage fragmentation of ownership shares in order to 
maximize value on other axes. For instance, in many common-interest 
developments, the ideal asset configuration for unit owners includes a 
series of servitudes ensuring quiet, clean and safe surroundings, neigh-
bors with similar preferences for local amenities, and aesthetically 
harmonious exteriors. From a condominium unit owner’s perspective, 
the problem may be not that a large asset is divided among too many 
owners, but rather that alternative asset configurations are too small 
or ill-fitting to ensure all the attributes that they want in their prop-
erty. Owning a unit in a common-interest development enables own-
ers to achieve new asset configurations that allow them to enjoy 
amenities without having to assemble all the attributes they value into 
one large individually owned parcel. The clash between the demands 
of the asset configuration (maximum value at substantial “fragmenta-
tion” of unit ownership) and single ownership (maximum value at 
zero “fragmentation”) leads, in such cases, to overall maximum value 
at substantial fragmentation. Thus, it is not surprising that many indi-
viduals are eager to live in common-interest developments notwith-
standing limitations that should theoretically lower asset value. Nor is 
it surprising that courts have been willing to develop the law of servi-
tudes in ways that encourage fragmentation.  
By focusing on fragmentation, Heller and Parisi do not pay suffi-
cient heed to the fact that property law not only seeks to block too 
many owners but also to drive toward an optimal asset configuration. 
Thus “fragmentation” that looks undesirable on one dimension because 
it creates too many owners looks highly desirable on another dimen-
sion because it creates the optimal “thing” subject to property. This 
claim can be stated more broadly: the fragmentation other theorists 
view as an anomaly appears very rational when one includes the dimen-
                                                                                                                      
Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 Ohio St L J 1041 (2003); Hsu, 36 UC Davis L Rev 
813 (cited in note 13); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticom-
mons, 91 Cal L Rev 439, 509–13 (2003); James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Trage-
dies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J L & Econ 1 (2000). 
 85 It should be noted, though, that Parisi also analyzes the dominion-related aspects of 
fragmentation. See Parisi, 50 Am J Comp L at 609–10, 614–15 (cited in note 8). See also Ben W.F. 
Depoorter and Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of Property Rights: A Functional Interpretation of 
the Law of Servitudes, 3 Global Jurist Frontiers, Issue 1, Article 2, at 3 (2003), online at http:// 
www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol3/iss1/art2/ (visited June 8, 2008). 
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sion of asset size and configuration in the analysis. Indeed, in a three-
dimensional model of property law, oftentimes the law must be as con-
cerned with insufficient fragmentation as with excessive fragmentation. 
B. Commons Property 
In her work, Carol Rose has studied various common property 
forms. Rose has posited that the persistence of common property pos-
es a puzzle to champions of private property, who maintain that com-
mon property regimes lead to overuse of assets and depletion of re-
sources. She has noted that “the nineteenth-century common law of 
property in both Britain and America, with surprising consistency, 
recognized two distinguishable types of public property.”
86
 The first is 
“property ‘owned’ and actively managed by a governmental body.”
87
 
The other is “property collectively ‘owned’ and ‘managed’ by society 
at large, with claims independent of and indeed superior to the claims 
of any purported governmental manager”—a category that most 
would call common property but that Rose dubs “inherently public 
property.”
88
 Rose has pointed out that the law employed such doc-
trines as prescriptive easements, public trust, and custom to protect 
the claims of the general public to such assets as pathways, waterways, 
shores, and hunting grounds.
89
 
Why did those assets remain inherently public? One cause is fear 
of monopolization and holdouts. Rose used this rationale to justify the 
recognition of public rights in passageways.
90
 She pointed out, though, 
that the holdout rationale is unpersuasive when applied to “such pub-
lic trust uses as swimming, fishing, and hunting.”
91
 Recreational uses 
may occur in many different places and hence there is no reason to 
grant use rights to the public in a specific lot.
92
 Therefore Rose ex-
plained the legal recognition of public rights in recreational uses on 
the grounds of economies of scale and maximization of group welfare. 
For instance, Rose argued that value would rise for each participant in 
a periodic communal dance as each new participant joined. In her 
words, recreational activities “have value precisely because they rein-
force the solidarity and fellow-feeling of the whole community; thus 
                                                                                                                      
 86 Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U Chi L Rev 711, 720 (1986). 
 87 Id.  
 88 Id.  
 89 See id at 722.  
 90 See id at 752 (“Without public prescription doctrine, each owner along the way might 
bar the passage at will and siphon off its public value.”). 
 91 Id at 758.  
 92 Id.  
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the more members of the community who participate, even if only as 
observers, the better for all.”
93
 
An obvious difficulty with Rose’s reliance on economies of scale 
and network effects is that they do not lend any particular support for 
favoring common property over private property. Telecommunications 
display strong network effects—that is, within a range, the addition of 
each user increases the value of the service for all others—yet the net-
work is predicated on private property.
94
 The same is true of credit cards 
and various types of computer software such as operating systems.
95
 
The three-dimensional view offers an alternative way to under-
stand the problem. The existence of common properties is indeed at 
odds with property law’s preference for a single owner. However, 
ownership, or the number of owners, is not the only dimension the law 
must optimize. When asset size or configuration is added to the analy-
sis, it becomes apparent that in some cases the ideal number of owners 
is not necessarily one.  
The choice between a single private owner and multiple owners 
involves an important tradeoff. Private ownership sometimes gives 
rise to a problem of underconsumption. This problem occurs when 
assets are too large to be consumed by a single individual but extraor-
dinarily costly or physically impossible to divide. In such cases, optimal 
use of the assets requires the owner to share the consumption of the 
asset with others. However, such sharing involves transaction costs. As 
a result, some particularly large assets may remain underutilized. 
Common property, as was noted numerous times in the past, displays 
the opposite problem of overconsumption.
96
 
Accordingly, where very large assets are concerned, lawmakers 
face a choice between two types of costs. They can push towards divid-
ing and reconfiguring the asset into smaller units and establishing pri-
vate property rights in the smaller units or subject it to common prop-
erty and accept the cost of overconsumption. Depending on their par-
ticular configuration, there can be assets for which the cost of recon-
figuration and privatization are greater than the cost of overconsump-
tion. For example, the cost of formalizing and enforcing rights in navi-
gable waters might be much higher than the cost of overuse under 
                                                                                                                      
 93 Id at 767–68. 
 94 Compare Mark A. Lemley and Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Gov-
ern Information?, 85 Tex L Rev 783, 812 (2007) (explaining how the failure of the FCC’s unbundling 
program in the telecommunications industry can be attributed to a misunderstanding of “semi-
commons” property, where one firm has legal access to use the private property of another). 
 95 See Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 Geo Mason L Rev 673, 673 (1999).  
 96 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244 (1968). 
File: 3 - Bell-Parchomovsky Final 0904 Created on:  9/4/2008 6:55:00 PM Last Printed: 10/1/2008 5:26:00 PM 
1038 The University of Chicago Law Review [75:1015 
common property. In such cases, it makes sense to subject the asset to 
common ownership. 
C. First Possession 
In an important contribution to the canon of property scholar-
ship, Richard Epstein discussed the centrality of the concept of a sin-
gle owner to the design of efficient legal rules.
97
 Epstein argued that 
when high transaction costs prevent efficient allocation of resources 
through contracts, lawmakers should “refer to the test of the ‘single 
owner’ as a way to think about structuring legal relationships across 
separate persons in a way that maximizes their joint output, when co-
operative behavior among them is not possible.”
98
 According to Ep-
stein, the turn to the single-owner test will best aid the government in 
attempting to approximate the results of hypothetical transactions 
among private actors when high transaction costs prevent such trans-
acting from actually occurring. Epstein proceeded to note that in de-
signing specific doctrines, lawmakers should consider the potential of 
the rules to generate externalities and holdouts.
99
 
Epstein used this framework to explain such property doctrines 
as first possession. He defended first possession as a principle of ap-
propriation of rights. Epstein admitted that the doctrine of first pos-
session itself creates negative externalities.
100
 However, he justified it 
on the ground that it lowers correction costs relative to alternative 
collective allocation mechanisms.
101
 In a world with positive transac-
tion costs, pace Epstein, the cost of correcting mistakes in the initial 
allocation far outweigh the negative externalities generated by the 
first possession doctrine.
102
 
Epstein next turned his attention to the question of dominion, or 
design of the optimal bundle of rights, that first possession should re-
ceive. He maintained that the common law’s decision to fashion own-
ership to entail “possession, use and disposition [ ] is an effort to over-
come the problem of subsequent transactions costs by giving a single 
person the control over all relevant aspects of a single thing.”
103
 
Unfortunately, Epstein stopped short of addressing the third di-
mension of asset specification, disposing of it by simply referring to all 
                                                                                                                      
 97 See Epstein, 36 J L & Econ at 562–63 (cited in note 8). 
 98 Id at 556. 
 99 See id at 557 (maintaining that “the purpose of all legal rules is to minimize the sum of 
the costs that are associated with these two forms of bargaining obstacles”). 
 100 See id at 561. 
 101 See id at 562 (basing this statement on “[a] rough empirical guess”). 
 102 See id at 562–63. 
 103 Id at 562 (emphasis added). 
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objects of first possession as “thing[s].” From a three-dimensional lens, 
the issue of asset specification is crucial, and, without reference to it, it is 
impossible to offer a comprehensive justification for first possession. 
Consider the celebrated case of Johnson v M’Intosh.
104
 This case is 
(in)famous for its discussion of the principle of discovery as the basis 
for acquisition of property rights in land. The principle of discovery, 
however, says nothing about how to determine the assets that may be 
acquired by discovery. Does the discoverer—or in this case, the con-
queror—acquire rights only in the entire North American continent? 
In all the lands that were not yet possessed by another European 
power? In land stretching as far as the eye can see? Or only in land on 
which it set foot?
105
 
Naturally, the determination of the assets to be gained has impor-
tant efficiency implications. The greater the territory, the greater is the 
holdout problem and the subsequent correction costs that concern 
Epstein. Inattention to the dimension of assets invariably changes the 
relative efficiency of alternative acquisition rules, and the analysis 
cannot proceed without reference to this aspect. 
To illustrate, let us turn to the issue of water rights. In Colorado, 
the first appropriator of water obtains rights not only in the amount 
she actually puts to a beneficial use but also to a share in the common 
pool.
106
 In Massachusetts, by contrast, the first appropriator does not 
acquire any particular rights in the pool.
107
 Rather, if she is a riparian 
owner, she receives a right to a reasonable use of the pool subject to 
the like uses of other riparian owners. Neither rule corresponds to the 
classic first possession rule in which one owns all that one seizes. Sim-
ply focusing on the priority of the first actor does not help resolve how 
to define the scope of the property right obtained. 
                                                                                                                      
 104 21 US 543 (1823). See also Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 19 L & Hist Rev 67, 69 (2001) (contending that the M’Intosh rule served as 
a cost-effective way for Europeans to expropriate Native American lands but that there was no 
real dispute in this case since the parties did not truly have conflicting claims to the land).  
 105 For other discussions of the doctrine of discovery, see generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, 
Chief Justice John Marshall and the Doctrine of Discovery: Friend or Foe to the Indians?, 42 Tulsa 
L Rev 125 (2006). 
 106 See, for example, Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Co, 6 Colo 443 (1882) (establishing the Colo-
rado doctrine of first appropriation). For further discussion, see David B. Schorr, Appropriation 
as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 Ecology L Q 3 (2005) 
(contending that the Colorado rule was intentionally designed to prevent control of water by 
capitalists and embodies an antimonopolistic, agrarian ideal). 
 107 See, for example, Stratton v Mt. Hermon Boys’ School, 103 NE 87, 88 (Mass 1913) (deny-
ing an absolute right of property in water and stating that “[t]he use of the water flowing in a 
stream is common to all riparian owners and each must exercise this common right so as not 
essentially to interfere with an equally beneficial enjoyment of the common right by his fellow 
riparian owners”). 
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The different evolution of water rights in different states demon-
strates why one must heed all three dimensions. When analyzed on 
one or two dimensions alone, acquisition rules may look very similar 
to one another. Once the dimension of assets is added to the mix, it 
becomes clear that ostensibly similar rules can lead to dramatically 
different results. 
D. Nuisance 
Nuisance law is designed to deal with the problem of externalities 
among property owners. It provides a cause of action for private nui-
sance whenever a property owner uses her land in a way that substan-
tially (and unreasonably) interferes with the use and enjoyment of 
land by other owners.
108
 Most modern theorists have analyzed the 
problem of nuisance by focusing on the dimension of dominion.
109
 For 
example, Henry Smith pointed out that nuisance doctrine oscillates be-
tween an exclusion model and a governance (or management) model. 
In some instances—depending on the specific circumstances of the 
case—the law grants an aggrieved owner exclusion rights against the 
creator of the nuisance whereas in others the law seeks to reconcile 
the conflicting land uses of the parties by establishing more detailed 
and nuanced management rules.
110
 
In a similar vein, Epstein noted that the design of nuisance doc-
trine reflects a balance of the twin forces that obstruct efficient alloca-
tion of resources: externalities and holdouts.
111
 If the law grants property 
owners very weak protection against nuisance, there will be a serious 
externalities problem. If, on the other hand, the law gives very strong 
protection against nuisance, property owners will not be able to conduct 
high-value activities that impact neighboring lots without first negotiat-
ing permission from the affected neighbors. Under such a regime, a se-
rious holdout problem will emerge. Nuisance doctrine is sensitive to 
both these concerns. It entitles aggrieved property owners to a remedy 
only when the interference with their use and enjoyment is substantial 
(as opposed to trifling).
112
 Moreover, when the value of the activity giv-
                                                                                                                      
 108 See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 87 at 622–23 (West 5th ed 1984) 
(discussing the requirements for recovery on a private nuisance theory). 
 109 See, for example, Richard R. Powell, 6 The Law on Real Property § 64.02[1]–[3] at 64-10 
to 64-13 (Matthew Bender 2007) (Michael Allan Wolf, ed) (explaining nuisance law as setting 
restrictions on owners’ power to use land in certain ways). 
 110 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va L Rev 
965, 974–75 (2004) (asserting that information costs can explain how regimes of exclusion and 
governance define entitlements in nuisance law). 
 111 See Epstein, 36 J L & Econ at 557, 573 (cited in note 8). 
 112 Id at 575 (explaining that the law should not grant injunctive relief for every minor 
interference because of the massive holdout potential). 
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ing rise to the nuisance is very high, the remedy awarded to successful 
plaintiffs will typically be damages (as opposed to injunctive relief).
113
 
Neither Smith nor Epstein fully explores the three dimensions of 
the nuisance problem. They both assume a single owner and seek to 
deal with the externalities problem by adjusting the owner’s bundle of 
rights. However, in principle, the problem of nuisance could have been 
dealt with by adjusting asset size or asset characterization. For exam-
ple, if all land were under single ownership there would be no need for 
nuisance law as no nuisances would ever arise. Thinking about the 
problem from an assets perspective suggests that one way to minimize 
external effects among neighbors would be to increase lot sizes or by 
changing asset configurations. Indeed, zoning law serves this purpose 
by restricting certain uses to certain areas. Among other things, zoning 
ordinances attempt to separate industrial uses from residential ones, 
designating each use category to a different area.
114
 
Introducing the asset dimension to the analysis yields a very in-
teresting insight about the socially optimal approach to nuisances. Ep-
stein’s article is an expansion of—and a tribute to—Ronald Coase’s 
seminal article in which he established the connection between nui-
sance and transaction costs.
115
 Nuisance disputes are born out of two 
problems: externalities and transaction costs. The former problem 
gives rise to the dispute while the latter is the main obstacle to solving 
it privately through negotiations. 
In principle, lawmakers could eliminate all nuisance disputes by 
fully specifying property rights that concentrate all ownership over every 
possible thing that may be affected in one person or by configuring as-
sets in a way that would prevent all spillovers. For example, in a world 
in which all land were owned by a single owner, no nuisance disputes 
would ever arise. Such a solution, however, will come at an enormous 
cost to society. Configuring assets in a way that would prevent all nui-
sances would be devilishly expensive, and the cost of concentrating all 
land in a single owner would result in a dramatic loss of value. 
                                                                                                                      
 113 See, for example, Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co, Inc, 257 NE2d 870, 873 (NY 1970) 
(granting an injunction to be vacated upon payment of permanent damages by the cement fac-
tory to neighboring landowners). See also Epstein, 36 J L & Econ at 576 (cited in note 8) 
(explaining that remedies are a function of the inverse relationship between externalities and 
holdouts and suggesting that a damage remedy is appropriate when the externality imposed on 
the plaintiff is much smaller than the holdout problem). 
 114 This goal lies at the very core of zoning. See Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272 
US 365, 390 (1926) (noting that the crux of recent zoning legislation was “the creation and main-
tenance of residential districts, from which business and trade of every sort, including hotels and 
apartment houses, are excluded”). 
 115 See Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 16 (cited in note 38). 
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Accordingly, it is better to adopt an approach to nuisance that 
seeks to achieve a compromise on all three dimensions, concentrating 
most rights over manageably small assets in the hands of a large num-
ber of distinct single owners. This implies a conscious acceptance of a 
certain level of nuisance in society. We agree to live with nuisances 
because we believe that the cost of resolving nuisance disputes, though 
real, are much lower than the cost of configuring assets in ways that 
internalize all externalities. The asset dimension offers a way to re-
solve nuisance suits, but it is not cost-effective. 
E. Eminent Domain 
The power of eminent domain allows the government to force 
property owners to transfer their title to the government in exchange 
for the payment of just compensation.
116
 The standard economic justi-
fication for this power is that without it land assembly effort will run 
aground due to holdouts. For example, Judge Posner refers to the hol-
douts as “[t]he only justification” for the power of eminent domain.
117
 
Current theorizing, therefore, conceives of eminent domain as a solu-
tion to a problem of too many owners, each of whom wields the power 
to stop socially efficient projects. The power to take involuntarily al-
lows the government to overcome holdouts and replace multiple own-
ers of the necessary plots with a single owner—namely the govern-
ment itself. This conceptualization of eminent domain is so entrenched 
in the minds of both scholars and students that it has blinded us to the 
possibility of alternative ways of thinking about the problem.  
From a three-dimensional perspective, the underlying problem is 
not necessarily one of too many owners but rather of suboptimally 
configured assets. Assume that the government needs a large tract to 
construct a military base. The government would need to resort to 
land assembly only if there are not any individual tracts of adequate 
size. If there were sufficiently large tracts, fewer holdout problems 
would arise, and the government could acquire title to one or more of 
the tracts through voluntary negotiations. 
The focus on asset size and configuration is not merely a theo-
retical nicety, leading to a different conceptualization of the problem. 
As we shall see later in the Article, it also offers an array of new ap-
                                                                                                                      
 116 See US Const, Amend V.  
 117 Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv L Rev 32, 93 (2005) (referring 
to eminent domain as an “almost random form of taxation” that enriches the government at the 
expense of the private landowner and is only justified in a very narrow set of circumstances). 
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proaches to situations that have been thought to require transfer of 
title via eminent domain.
118
 
III.  THREE-DIMENSIONAL STRATEGIES 
Having demonstrated the importance of three-dimensionality to 
property, we now turn to the specific strategies employed by lawmak-
ers in light of that three-dimensionality. In order to maximize the val-
ue of property rights across society, lawmakers have to maximize their 
value as a function of three variables that do not always move in the 
same direction—owner, asset, and dominion.  
The framework developed in this Article makes it possible to di-
vide property doctrine into six distinct categories intended to recon-
cile the inherent tension that exists among the three dimensions. It is 
important to emphasize at the outset that we do not argue that these 
strategies were consciously devised by lawmakers. In other words, we 
do not offer in this Part a theory of how property rights are developed 
in the political arena or an evolutionary account of property law.
119
 We 
merely seek to explain how property rules have been grouped in the 
past in response to three-dimensional challenges and, thereby, to ad-
vance a coherent view of property law that arises from our three-
dimensional approach.  
Furthermore, we do not argue that our proposed categorization is 
the only possible one or even that it covers the field of all possible 
strategies. We readily admit that competing conceptualizations of 
property doctrines are possible. Yet, until such competing conceptuali-
zations are offered, we posit that our three-dimensional approach of-
fers an important perspective on property law in its entirety.  
In the remainder of this Part, we outline the six reconciliatory 
strategies and demonstrate how they have been used. We would like 
to emphasize at the outset that the six strategies are not mutually ex-
clusive, and, indeed, in the proceeding discussion we will highlight ar-
eas of overlap. We posit that these strategies hold the key for under-
standing extant property law. Additionally, we submit that compre-
hending the interplay of the strategies and identifying their relative 
advantages unlocks the hidden potential for superior solutions to 
many of property’s dilemmas. Finally, we suggest that a better under-
standing of these strategies and their three-dimensional motivations 
                                                                                                                      
 118 See Part IV.D.  
 119 Compare generally Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J 
Legal Stud 421 (2002) (advancing a theory that transaction costs and interest groups drove the 
movement of property from the commons to privatization and, in several instances, back again to 
a more open-access arrangement). 
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creates a starting point for more deliberate and targeted use of these 
strategies in the future, as well as possibly suggesting new and as yet 
undeveloped strategies. 
A. Fictional Owners 
The first strategy we discuss is lawmakers’ recognition of a fic-
tional owner in order to concentrate ownership in a single owner, even 
though many persons share actual ownership. 
Often, a given property item’s asset configuration is such that the 
asset is too large for a single owner to exercise absolute dominion. But 
it is advantageous to reconfigure the owner in order to reach a single 
owner, rather than reconfigure or divide the asset. The most obvious 
instance of a large asset is a big physical item, like a skyscraper. How-
ever, the asset need not be a single physical thing—indeed, many of 
the cases in which the law employs the strategy of a “fictional owner” 
involve compound assets that combine many physical items. For in-
stance, the single largest asset may be a business, which comprises 
many discrete and smaller items, including intangible assets such as 
goodwill. For obvious reasons, however, managing the business as a 
whole, rather than separate management of the component items, may 
sometimes produce great social utility.
120
 
While corporations are the most outstanding (and widely used) 
form of fictional owner, property law abounds with examples outside 
the corporate context. Married couples are considered a single owner-
                                                                                                                      
 120 Ronald Coase paved the way for the “make or pay” analysis—whether corporations 
should produce components or services internally, or purchase on the market. See generally R.H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937) (theorizing that firms arise in order to 
economize on transaction costs because the higher the cost of transacting externally on the 
market, the greater the comparative advantage of producing a firm’s needs internally). Since 
Coase’s pathbreaking article, an extensive literature has developed. See generally, for example, 
Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organi-
zations, 62 Am Econ Rev 777 (1972) (exploring the team productive process and why it induces 
the contractual formation of the firm); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. 
Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J L 
& Econ 297 (1978) (describing how the potential postcontractual extraction of high rents induces 
parties to integrate vertically rather than contract); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-cost Eco-
nomics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J L & Econ 233 (1979) (using the three 
dimensions of frequency, investment idiosyncrasy, and uncertainty to characterize transaction 
costs and match them with appropriate governance structures); Oliver E. Williamson, The Eco-
nomic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (Free Press 1985) (de-
scribing the analytical framework of transaction cost economics and applying it to different 
contractual settings); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 
Colum L Rev 1757 (1989) (finding the transaction cost economics model of the firm unconvinc-
ing and advancing a property-rights approach in which firms are characterized by their nonhu-
man assets); Bengt Holmström and John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J 
Econ Perspectives 73 (1998) (arguing for a broader view of the firm than has been provided by 
either transaction cost economics or property rights theory). 
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ship unit for some purposes,
121
 as are many other types of partner-
ships.
122
 Trusts have a separate legal personality that owns the assets in 
place of the beneficiaries.
123
 By a like token, decedents’ estates replace 
the deceased as “owner” of her property until final distribution of the 
assets and winding up of the estate.
124
 
In all these instances, recognition of a single fictional owner per-
mits the fictional owner to manage the large asset as an individual, 
even though the fictional owner may itself be a compound person, 
such as a public corporation. From a property perspective, bestowing 
legal rights on corporations and other fictional owners places formal 
ownership of the corporate assets in the hands of the corporations, 
while giving individual shareholders only partial ownership of the 
corporation itself, rather than the assets. 
This recognition of the corporation as a separate “personality,” 
rather than a collection of individuals tied together through a network 
of contracts, preserves many of the most important benefits of prop-
erty law. First, the fiction of a corporate person preserves the ability of 
a single individual (or small number of individuals) to dispose of good 
title to an asset, even while the controlling individual remains respon-
sible to many others under related bodies of law.
125
 This reduces trans-
action costs by permitting those dealing with the corporation to rely 
upon the decisions of the authorized individuals
126
 without having to 
seek approval of all or most of the “real” owners (that is, shareholders). 
Effectively, corporate ownership strips each individual shareholder of 
her power to exclude and grants this power to the group of sharehold-
                                                                                                                      
 121 See, for example, the discussion of tenancies by the entirety in Sawada v Endo, 561 P2d 
1291, 1295 (Hawaii 1977) (holding that the tenancy by the entirety is predicated upon the legal 
unity of husband and wife in single ownership and cannot be conveyed or reached by execution 
through either spouse alone). 
 122 See Robert W. Hillman, Allan W. Vestal, and Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act § 201(a) at 79 (West 2006) (“A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.”). 
 123 See Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 NYU L Rev 434, 472 (1998). 
 124 See generally, for example, Joint Properties Owners, Inc v Deri, 113 AD2d 691 (NY App 
Div 1986) (noting that the leasehold interest does not terminate upon the lessee’s death but passes 
as personal property to the decedent’s estate). 
 125 For further discussion, see generally Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-based Approach to 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 Colum L Rev 1203 (2002) (proposing to hold 
controlling shareholders liable for corporate torts and statutory violations based on their level of 
involvement).  
 126 See generally Coase, 4 Economica 386 (cited in note 120); Williamson, 22 J L & Econ 
233 (cited in note 120); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J L & Econ 301 (1983) (arguing that the separation of decisionmaking and risk-
bearing functions survives in large corporations because it can control agency problems and 
effectively use specific knowledge in decisionmaking). 
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ers as a whole, through various voting mechanisms.
127
 A prospective 
buyer of a corporately owned parcel of land can obtain the same title 
as she would in purchasing the land from an ordinary private owner 
simply by contracting with a duly authorized corporate agent without 
worrying herself with any of the formalities of the internal corporate 
decisionmaking process. 
Second, the fiction discourages configuration of assets into sub-
optimally small sizes and instead creates a mechanism for preserving 
assets at their optimal size. Where individuals cannot aggregate owner 
shares into larger fictional owners, they often find that an asset, as or-
dinarily configured, is too large for their purposes. This may be for the 
mundane reason that the asset is so valuable that it takes up too much 
of the owner’s asset portfolio and blocks diversification of asset risk.
128
 
Or, it may be because the asset itself is of such a physical size that it 
cannot cost-effectively be used by a single individual. Without the op-
tion of preserving the larger asset configuration through the ownership 
of a “larger” fictional owner, individual owners might frequently find 
that they enhance their own utility by destroying asset value, causing an 
unfortunate and unnecessary loss of utility to society.
129
 
The fictional owner strategy thereby preserves many of the ad-
vantages of property law in enhancing social utility derived from asset 
management by compromising along the owner axis in order to pre-
serve optimal asset configuration. Further, by aggregating the owners 
into a fictional unity, property law minimizes the dissipation of utility 
caused by splitting assets among too many owners. 
B. Fictional Assets 
Another strategy the law employs is the creation of fictional as-
sets. The “reification” of property rights in Anglo-American law has 
often been dismissed as an excessively formalistic device or even a 
philosophical error.
130
 Yet the strategy of fictional assets offers a solu-
                                                                                                                      
 127 See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?, 70 S 
Cal L Rev 741, 743 (1997) (“Although an investor’s decision to join an investors’ group is made on 
an individual basis . . . from that moment onward . . . most decisions must be made collectively.”).  
 128 See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning, 
44 Eur Econ Rev 807–17 (2000) (discussing the importance of organizational law in permitting a 
better match of asset packages for different tastes and desires for risk). 
 129 For a fascinating exploration of situations in which an owner will find it cost effective to 
destroy asset value to maximize owner utility, see generally Allen, 31 J Legal Stud 339 (cited in 
note 53). 
 130 See, for example, Douglas Litowitz, Reification in Law and Legal Theory, 9 S Cal Inter-
discipl L J 401, 401 (2000) (“As applied to law, reification represents a kind of infection . . . because 
it is essentially an error, a delusion, and a mystification that blinds people to alternative legal ar-
rangements by ‘naturalizing’ the existing legal system as inevitable.”). 
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tion to two distinct problems. First, by permitting the recognition of 
property rights in fictional assets, property law extends its scope to 
intangible and abstract items of value like ideas and expressions. Sec-
ond, by permitting ownership of abstractions, the fictional asset strat-
egy permits dividing ownership of large physical objects among sev-
eral owners while still minimizing transaction costs. In each case, the 
fictional asset permits adherence to the ideal package of ownership, 
asset, and dominion by configuring the asset into a form amenable to 
the standard property package. 
Let us examine each of these two advantages in turn. 
The most obvious instance of ownership of abstract assets can be 
found in the law of intellectual property. Intellectual property law rec-
ognizes and protects rights in intangible informational assets. The de-
fining characteristic of intellectual goods is their lack of physicality.
131
 
While many intellectual goods need a physical embodiment for mar-
keting purposes, it is the informational content—and not the physical 
embodiment—that is the subject of intellectual property protection. 
Due to their intangible nature, intellectual assets do not have clear 
boundaries. Indeed, defining the boundaries of intellectual assets is 
one of the most difficult challenges lawmakers must confront.
132
 Yet, 
without legal protection, much of the value inherent in intellectual 
goods would be lost.
133
 Because the initial production of intellectual 
goods often necessitates considerable investment and once produced 
they can be copied at a very low cost, there is a serious risk that not 
enough intellectual goods would be created without legal protection. 
Hence, the recognition of fictional assets, in this context, is deemed 
necessary to ensure adequate production of certain types of informa-
tional content.
134
 
Even for physical objects, the fictional asset strategy is pervasive 
and important. By permitting owners to slice up a physical “thing” 
into slices small enough to be amenable to full dominion by a single 
owner, the law maintains single owners with relatively uncompro-
mised dominion (subject only to the rules of waste) over full and sepa-
rate—albeit fictional—assets, instead of having to acknowledge multi-
ple owners over the same asset. While property law concerns “things” 
                                                                                                                      
 131 See Dan L. Burk, Transborder Intellectual Property Issues on the Electronic Frontier, 6 Stan 
L & Policy Rev 9, 9–10 (1994) (explaining that “[u]nlike physical goods, intellectual goods lack the 
barriers that would allow their investors to prevent their free appropriation by consumers”).  
 132 See, for example, Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 
84 Tex L Rev 395, 429–30 (2005) (discussing the difficulties involved in defining the boundaries 
of ideas and inventions).  
 133 See Burk, 6 Stan L & Policy Rev at 9 (cited in note 131).  
 134 See, for example, Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect 
Patent Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 San Diego L Rev 987, 991 (2000). 
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and therefore naturally gravitates toward recognizing ownership in 
physical items, the law also readily recognizes ownership in abstrac-
tions. Indeed, the reification of property rights in Anglo-American law, 
beginning in the Middle Ages, resulted in viewing all ownership inter-
ests in property as attached not to physical items at all, but rather to 
abstract estates that denote packages of rights regarding those items.
135
 
Under the estate system, an owner of real property never owns the 
underlying realty, but rather an estate in the realty.
136
 If Sarah owns 
Blackacre, the estate system dictates that she does not own the land 
itself, but rather a fee simple absolute estate in Blackacre.  
The estate system creates valuable distinctions that improve the 
ability to manage assets. The central feature of the estate system is its 
division of ownership along a temporal axis. Estates are divided be-
tween present and future interests; both kinds of estates are real in-
terests that may currently be transferred and otherwise dealt with, but 
only the present interests contain a present right of possession.
137
 Fu-
ture interests contain only a future right of possession. Since the life of 
most assets in realty is much longer than that of human beings, the 
estate system made it possible to slice up the life of assets into smaller 
time periods and make a single person the owner of each discrete 
smaller (albeit abstract) asset. Thus, Jonathan, with a life estate in 
Blackacre, would own a real asset in a size that he could use during his 
lifetime, while leaving to Keith (the remainderman), an asset that Jo-
nathan would manage less well. Yet, because each estate is a distinct 
asset, many of the advantages of the Blackstonian property ideal—
such as easy alienability—are maintained. 
This strategy is exemplified in the case of Gruen v Gruen.
138
 There 
a father wished to give his son a painting by Gustav Klimt as a twenti-
eth birthday gift but continue to retain possession of the painting dur-
ing his own life.
139
 In this case, the existence of a fictional asset—the 
vested remainder—enabled the father both to enjoy the painting dur-
ing his life and to give his son a gift of that part of the value of the 
painting that the father could not enjoy. If fictional assets did not exist, 
the father could attempt to achieve the same result by bequeathing 
                                                                                                                      
 135 Jesse Dukeminier, et al, Property 175–82 (Aspen 6th ed 2006) (discussing the evolution 
of the estates system, which arose out of feudalism and defined estates according to their length 
of endurance).  
 136 Id at 182 (“The development of the fee simple estate is an example of that most striking 
phenomenon of English land law, the reification of abstractions, a process of thinking that still 
pervades our law.”). While the estate system originally applied only to land, it was subsequently 
extended to other tangible and intangible assets. 
 137 Id at 181–82, 186–90, 225–28. 
 138 496 NE2d 869 (NY 1986). 
 139 See id at 871. 
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the painting to his son in his will. Doing so, however, would have en-
tailed two distinct costs. First, it would have diminished the enjoyment 
of the gift-giver. In Gruen, the date of the gift held emotional signifi-
cance, as it was the son’s twentieth birthday, not at the much later date 
of his father’s death. Second, and more importantly, the recognition of 
future interests enhances the efficient management of assets. In per-
mitting creation of a future interest, the law creates the possibility of a 
single owner who will obtain greater enjoyment and employ superior 
management strategies. In Gruen, for example, the father wanted little 
from the painting after his life other than to be sure that his son would 
enjoy its value. Once in possession of the future interest, the son could 
sell it, mortgage it, diversify his investment holdings around it, and 
otherwise deploy it to its greatest advantage, all without disturbing the 
father’s enjoyment of possession.
140
 
It is worth noting that a fictional asset strategy may be available 
alongside other strategies, such as that of a fictional owner. For in-
stance, in Gruen, the father could have made himself a trustee for his 
son and transferred ownership of the painting to the new trust (a fic-
tional owner). This strategy would have permitted the father to enjoy 
the psychological benefit of the timely gift, though it might have com-
promised some of the transferability of the son’s interest.
141
 
C. Forced Aggregation or Disaggregation 
The third strategy—forced aggregation and disaggregation—can 
be applied both to physical assets (as exemplified by the doctrines of 
partition by sale and, most notably, takings by eminent domain) or to 
fictional assets (as illustrated by the doctrines of disentailing and the 
Rule against Perpetuities). This strategy aims at situations where the 
owner is unable to extract the full social value inherent in property 
ownership and is therefore likely to maintain the asset in a suboptimal 
configuration. The doctrines seek to force the property into the optimal 
asset configuration without compromising the drive toward a single 
owner, while minimizing the negative impact on owner dominion. 
Rules permitting disentailing provide the most obvious, albeit 
somewhat obscure, example of this strategy. Fees tail are estates en-
tailing a present right of possession that continues through the direct 
blood line. Created by a grant to X and “the heirs of his body,” the fee 
                                                                                                                      
 140 The father’s desire to avoid testamentary disposition was apparently influenced by his 
desire to lower estate tax exposure. See id. 
 141 A trust would have created a fiduciary duty in the father toward his son regarding the 
painting; this would be somewhat more exacting than the duty not to commit waste that was 
created by the actual transfer of the future interest.  
File: 3 - Bell-Parchomovsky Final 0904 Created on:  9/4/2008 6:55:00 PM Last Printed: 10/1/2008 5:26:00 PM 
1050 The University of Chicago Law Review [75:1015 
tail traditionally transferred possession from generation to generation 
of X’s descendants in what was essentially a series of life estates.
142
 
Grantors would presumably create this estate in order to enhance the 
prestige of their families by forcing future generations to retain the 
ancestral land, or because the grantors did not trust that future gen-
erations would be as prudent in managing the land as the grantor.
143
 
Nonetheless, indulging the grantor’s desires completely would come at 
too great a price to asset value. In our terms, the utility enjoyed by the 
grantor was outweighed by the disutility to future generations bur-
dened by a poorly configured asset that could not be easily trans-
ferred. In response to this problem, lawyers and courts developed the 
“common recovery,” allowing future generations to disentail the fee 
and return it to a fee simple.
144
 Ultimately, most jurisdictions abolished 
the fee tail, forcing the aggregation of existing fee tails and their at-
tendant future interests into fees simple absolute.
145
 
Legal control of aggregation and disaggregation is often neces-
sary for assets that are durable and large. The durability ensures that 
the property will likely last over several lifetimes, preventing any one 
owner from enjoying its full value. As a consequence of her limited 
ability to extract utility from the property, the owner’s incentives will 
not necessarily align with the interests of maximum asset value, and 
she may initiate various property configurations that seriously dimin-
ish asset value, as in the case of the fee tail.  
Other times, rules of aggregation and disaggregation provide a 
response to changes in external circumstances that affect the optimal 
use of assets. For instance, over time, the ideal use of a certain area 
may change from farming to railroad to shopping mall. The optimal 
parcel size for each of these uses is obviously different. Yet, voluntary 
aggregation of assets into the new configuration may be hampered by 
high transaction costs, and in particular by strategic barriers. The 
state’s power of eminent domain aims at resolving some of these 
                                                                                                                      
 142 The fee tail was originally codified in the Statute de Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw I, 
stat I (1285). In England, the successive life estates interpretation of the estate competed with 
several other conceptions, such as viewing only the first generation or the first three generations 
as equivalent to life estates. See John F. Hart, “A Less Proportion of Idle Proprietors”: Madison, 
Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail, 58 Wash & Lee L Rev 167, 172 (2001). 
 143 The fee tail could also be useful as a tax-saving device by avoiding estate taxes. See 
Dukeminier, et al, Property at 187 (cited in note 135) (noting that the fee tail, though passing 
from generation to generation, did not expire until the original tenant in fee tail and all of that 
tenant’s descendants were dead). 
 144 See id at 187–88 (describing common recovery as an expensive legal procedure used to 
restore alienability of the land). See also Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, The Rise of the 
Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L Rev 1303, 1320 (2003) (“Later, the common recovery was abolished, 
and a tenant in tail was permitted to convey a fee simple by a deed.”). 
 145 See Dukeminier, et al, Property at 188 (cited in note 135). 
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problems by permitting the seizure of a number of parcels despite the 
objections of holdouts and reconfiguring them into a new mix of par-
cel sizes and uses.
146
  
The example of takings most clearly demonstrates the importance 
of analyzing all the property dimensions at once. It is only the eclipse of 
the old combinations of single owner and asset that raises the need to 
create a new set of single-owner assets through forced transfers. Inter-
estingly, the change in the ideal asset size or configuration may warrant 
a transition to smaller, rather than larger, parcel sizes. Such was the case 
in Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff,
147
 where legislation employed 
the power of eminent domain to force owners to sell fee simple inter-
ests to their tenants in order to combat the problem of oligopoly cre-
ated by excessively concentrated land ownership in Hawaii.
148
 
D. Limits on Owner-initiated Reconfiguration or Size 
A related strategy employed by the law relies not upon the state’s 
direct aggregation or disaggregation of property, but, rather, its plac-
ing restrictions on the freedom of owners to alter the asset configura-
tions. Such restrictions may be effected either directly, for example, by 
zoning rules, or indirectly, through enforcement of nuisance suits or 
covenants in common-interest communities. In both cases, the goal of 
these restrictions is to preserve certain asset features that maximize 
the overall value of the affected assets. Private ordering through con-
tracts maximizes the welfare of the contracting parties but may do so 
at the expense of third parties who derive value from the asset. As in 
the case of single owners configuring assets suboptimally, this is due to 
asset value that cannot be captured by the contracting parties due to 
physical limitations or high transaction costs. 
For example, absent regulation or other legal restriction, property 
owners may choose to build a skyscraper on top of a historic land-
mark
149
 without taking full account of the value of the asset as a land-
mark. Some of the landmark value is long-lasting and will be enjoyed 
only by future generations that cannot compensate the owner for pre-
                                                                                                                      
 146 For a discussion of the role of eminent domain in countering strategic behavior, see 
Posner, 119 Harv L Rev at 93–94 (cited in note 117).  
 147 467 US 229 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of the Land Reform Act of 1967, 
Haw Rev Stat § 516, which authorized the Hawaii Housing Authority to use eminent domain as a 
tool to achieve market dilution). 
 148 See id at 233 (“[T]he Hawaii Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967 . . . which 
created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for transferring ownership of the 
condemned fees simple to existing lessees.” ). 
 
 149 See generally Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York, 438 US 104 (1978). 
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servation.
150
 In addition, some of the asset value is dispersed among the 
public at large, as it is available to passersby or even those who simply 
derive satisfaction from the landmark’s continued existence.
151
 Land-
mark protection legislation, which may take many forms including pro-
hibitory regulatory zoning and incentive-based tax schemes,
152
 aims to 
prevent physical alteration to assets that harm overall asset value. 
Other zoning regulations prevent physical alterations not for pro-
tection of asset utility enjoyed by future generations but rather to al-
locate asset configurations among existing owners. Ideally, such regu-
lations serve as a means of reducing negative externalities produced 
by suboptimal asset use at a lower cost than owner-by-owner negotia-
tions. For example, zoning may require a certain amount of green 
space to surround housing (through setback and minimum lot size 
rules).
153
 In all these cases, the zoning rule prohibits a particular action 
that may enhance an owner’s extraction of utility from the asset at a 
particular time but presumably would come at the expense of other 
owners’ utility from their nearby land. 
While one cannot deny that zoning can become the arena of rent-
seeking decisionmakers,
154
 the popularity of zoning even where mobility 
is high—as well as the voluntary creation of even more restrictive zon-
ing-like rules in planned developments—suggests that in many situa-
tions zoning enhances asset value.  
Regulation of asset characteristics is ubiquitous and by no means 
limited to realty. Virtually all assets, from cars to bank accounts, are 
subject to some form of regulation, restricting the owners’ ability to 
reconfigure them. Even fictional assets, such as copyrights, are subject 
to some restrictions on reconfiguration. Copyright owners must respect 
the moral rights of creators and refrain from changing expressive works. 
The purpose of this restriction is to protect the reputation of artists and 
                                                                                                                      
 150 See generally John Nivala, The Future for Our Past: Preserving Landmark Preservation, 
5 NYU Envir L J 83, 113 (1996) (noting that the only compensation the landowner receives for 
bearing the cost of preserving tomorrow’s heritage is “the advantage of living and doing business 
in a civilized community”).  
 151 See, for example, William A. Fischel, Lead Us Not into Penn Station: Takings, Historic 
Preservation, and Rent Control, 6 Fordham Envir L J 749, 753 (1995) (stating that even an iso-
lated landmark is “a building that provides something that almost all of us would characterize as 
a public benefit”). 
 152 For a discussion of preservation laws, see generally Carol M. Rose, Preservation and 
Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 Stan L Rev 473 (1981) (out-
lining the evolving rationale for modern preservation laws and showing how preservation law 
has also become a vehicle for community organization and politics). 
 153 See Kenneth H. Young, 2 Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 11:01 at 437 (Clark 
Boardman Callaghan 4th ed 1996) (“The common zoning regulation requires that the dwellings in 
a specific district be constructed on a lot of a minimum size, with minimum frontage and setback.”). 
 154 See generally William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights 
Approach to American Land Use Controls (Johns Hopkins 1985).  
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thereby the investment of other owners who might be adversely affected 
by alterations that are prejudicial to the artist’s reputation.
155
 
Outside of the regulatory arena, a number of other property rules 
can be seen as barring owner-initiated configurations of assets that are 
suboptimal. For example, rules barring certain chronological disaggre-
gations of assets, such as the Rule against Perpetuities,
156
 the Rule in 
Shelley’s Case,
157
 and a number of other obscure rules,
158
 prevent the crea-
tion of certain kinds of contingent future interests. Similarly, the elimina-
tion of the fee tail not only involved aggregating already-created assets 
but also prevented future owner-initiated creations of the estate.
159
 
The numerus clausus principle that underlies the law of property 
may be understood as embodying the same strategy. The principle 
limits the ability of private parties to create new property rights, re-
serving this power exclusively to the legislator. Merrill and Smith justi-
fied the principle on the grounds that it economizes on the informa-
tion costs of third parties.
160
 Given that property rights avail against the 
rest of the world, if individual owners could create new property rights 
on a whim, it would force the rest of the world to investigate the nature 
of the specific arrangements or risk violating them. The numerus clau-
sus rule primarily restricts the menu of available property rights
161
 and 
therefore mainly affects the dimension of owners’ domain. Yet the rule 
also indirectly restricts owners’ freedom to reconfigure their assets. 
E. Transfer or Elimination of Elements of Dominion 
Another strategy employed by policymakers to reconcile the three 
competing interests is to authorize the transfer of elements of dominion 
                                                                                                                      
 155 See generally Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: 
A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J Legal Stud 95 (1997) (arguing that the moral 
rights doctrine serves to provide economic benefits not just to the individual artist but also to 
owners of the artist’s work and the public at large). 
 156 The classic formulation of the rule is John Chipman Gray’s: “No interest is good unless it 
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the 
interest.” John C. Gray, The Rule against Perpetuities § 201 at 191 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1942). 
 157 The Rule in Shelley’s Case states “that if (1) one instrument (2) creates a life estate in 
land in A, and (3) purports to create a remainder in persons described as A’s heirs (or the heirs 
of A’s body), and (4) the life estate and remainder are both legal or both equitable, the remain-
der becomes a remainder in fee simple (or fee tail) in A.” Dukeminier, et al, Property at 243 
(cited in note 135). 
 158 Other rules include the rule of the destructibility of contingent remainders and the 
doctrine of worthier title. See id at 241–44. 
 159 See notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
 160 See Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 8 (cited in note 71) (“The existence of unusual 
property rights increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. . . . Stan-
dardization of property rights reduces these measurement costs.” ). 
 161 See id at 40 (describing how numerus clausus, though strongly restrictive, is also permis-
sive and therefore tends toward the optimal level of standardization). 
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to others or, in extreme cases, to transfer directly or eliminate domin-
ion elements altogether. This strategy limits property rights by limiting 
the dominion of the owner without forcing the addition of others to 
the ownership structure and without reducing the scope of the owned 
asset. As such, the strategy necessarily compromises the Blackstonian 
ideal, but it does so in order to preserve interests not protected by the 
ordinary structure of property law.  
This strategy often comes into play where assets consistently pro-
duce significant positive externalities making them valuable to others, 
while dispersing the benefits so as to preclude cost-effective bargain-
ing between the owners and individual beneficiaries of the positive 
externalities. The strategy seeks to preserve the positive externalities 
for others over time by creating tools that lock in value for beneficiar-
ies despite possible changes in ownership. 
Interestingly, the strategy is most valuable at opposite extremes 
of benefit dispersal. Where there is only a single beneficiary, individu-
alized bargaining might be foiled by strategic difficulties seen in a bi-
lateral monopoly.
162
 Conversely, where the beneficiary is a large and 
dispersed public, bargaining may be precluded by the fact that no in-
dividual beneficiary enjoys enough benefit to warrant transacting with 
the owner. Either way, the strategy offers a way to anchor such bargains 
as may be struck into property interests that bind successors in interest. 
Transfer of elements of an owner’s dominion to others is often 
carried out via formalization of various nonpossessory interests in 
assets. A familiar example is the formalization of conservation ease-
ments. Jurisdictions that recognize conservation easements permit 
landowners to grant third parties, typically an environmental organiza-
tion, a nonpossessory interest in the land in exchange for some tax 
benefits.
163
 The mechanism of conservation easements is designed to 
permit beneficiaries to bar socially undesirable uses of private land. 
By granting the easement, the owner restricts her dominion over her 
property, committing not to harm certain socially valuable characteris-
tics of the property. The recipient of the easement has no possessory 
rights and instead takes only a right to a particular use of the land and 
                                                                                                                      
 162 See generally Ian M. Dobbs and Martyn B. Hill, Pricing Solutions to the Bilateral Mo-
nopoly Problem under Uncertainty, 60 S Econ J 479 (1993) (deriving a nonuniform price solution 
to the bilateral monopoly problem in response to the suboptimal performance of uniform pricing). 
 163 See generally Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Ease-
ments, in Julie A. Gustanski and Roderick H. Squires, eds, Protecting the Land: Conservation 
Easements Past, Present, and Future 26 (Island 2000) (presenting a comparative analysis of the 
basic elements of conservation easements among different states). 
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the right to bar the owner’s interference therewith.
164
 Importantly, be-
cause the easement is a property right and not merely a contractual 
arrangement, it continues with the land and does not have to be re-
bargained with every new owner. 
The conveyance of elements of an owner’s dominion to others is 
also a viable means of preempting negative externalities. Indeed, all 
servitudes—easements, covenants, equitable servitudes, profits, and 
others—are understood in this light.
165
 Covenants, for example, are 
binding agreements founded in a property relationship that “run with 
the land” instead of dissipating with the departure of the original cove-
nantors.
166
 Covenants do not create new titleholders or owners of any of 
the concerned assets. Rather, they impose small restrictions on owner 
dominion in order to bestow nonpossessory rights on the covenantee. 
Sometimes, lawmakers deem it necessary to go beyond authoriz-
ing the transfer of elements of dominion to directly regulating or elimi-
nating certain dominion elements. This result is achieved by regulation 
or operation of law rather than by private bargain. Regulatory restric-
tions on owners’ dominion can be seen in use restrictions in zoning or-
dinances as well as various environmental and conservation laws. Zon-
ing regulations may prevent some owner uses such as the opening of 
gas stations in residential developments
167
 or the operation of industrial 
plants too close to neighboring homes.
168
 Statutes like the Clean Air 
Act,
169
 the Clean Water Act,
170
 and the Endangered Species Act
171
 pre-
vent, among other things, property owners from performing certain acts 
on their property that pollute or endanger certain animal and plant spe-
cies, and similarly inhabit the boundary between the two strategies. 
The law of waste—as applied between concurrent owners—is an-
other example. Essentially, the doctrine grants the owner out of pos-
session the power to prevent certain uses of the asset that may be 
                                                                                                                      
 164 See id at 27 (noting that the definition of a conservation easement varies across states 
and is defined by states who have adopted the Uniform Conservation Easement Act as a “non-
possessory interest . . . in real property”). 
 165 See Dukeminier, et al, Property at 667–71 (cited in note 135). 
 166 Id at 740–44.  
 167 See generally, for example, Sanborn v McLean, 206 NW 496 (Mich 1925) (enjoining the 
building of a gas station on land subject to a longstanding reciprocal negative easement prohibit-
ing non-residential buildings). 
 168 See generally, for example, Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co, Inc, 257 NE2d 870, 873 (NY 
1970). 
 169 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (“Clean Air Act”), Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 
1676 (1970), codified as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq (2000). 
 170 Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act (“Clean Water Act”), Pub L No 92-
500, 86 Stat 816 (1972), codified as amended at 33 USC § 1251 et seq (2000 & Supp 2004). 
 171 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified as amended at 
16 USC § 1531 et seq (2000).  
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deleterious to her interest.
172
 The law of waste effectively forces the 
owner in possession to take account of other concurrent owners’ in-
terests and refrain from acting in ways that maximize her payoffs at 
the expense of theirs. Without the law of waste, concurrent owners 
would likely be forced to maintain a physical presence on the property 
in order to monitor each other’s uses. Hence, the formalization of the 
law of waste makes it possible to use land more efficiently by entrust-
ing possession to single owners and lowering monitoring costs for 
owners out of possession. 
F. Differential Acquisition Rules  
A final strategy polices the degree and timing of privatization of 
assets. Thus, some resources are subject to a rule of capture, encourag-
ing rapid assimilation into the domain of private property, while oth-
ers are subject to rules such as reasonable use or public trust that pre-
vent full transition to private property.  
The rule of capture awards ownership of physical objects to the 
first person to reduce the items to possession.
173
 The classic form of the 
rule is found in Pierson v Post,
174
 which resolved a dispute between two 
hunters who claimed the same fox. The court ruled that foxes, as wild 
animals, were subject to seizure and the establishment of private prop-
erty rights upon capture, and that foxes hunted on public lands were 
captured and transformed into private property upon “occupation,” 
that is, physical seizure of the animals.
175
 The rule of capture has been 
applied in a number of other situations in which courts sought to es-
tablish how private property rights are established in “fugitive re-
sources.”
176
 In addition, property law contains many parallels to the 
rule of capture in which ownership goes to the first person to seize the 
asset and reduce it to possession. For example, the rule of discovery in 
                                                                                                                      
 172 See generally Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Plu-
ralist Interpretation, 91 Cornell L Rev 653, 658 (2006). 
 173 See the discussion in Smith, 90 Va L Rev at 1030–32 (cited in note 110).  
 174 3 Cai R 175 (NY Sup Ct 1805). 
 175 See id at 175. 
 176 See the discussion in Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the 
Law, 38 J L & Econ 393, 422–30 (1995):  
First possession rules are the dominant method of initially establishing property rights. Such 
rules grant a legitimate ownership claim to the party that gains control before other poten-
tial claimants. They have been applied widely in both common and statute law, in such var-
ied settings as abandoned property, adverse possession, bona fide purchasing, the electro-
magnetic spectrum, emissions rights, fisheries and wildlife, groundwater, hardrock minerals, 
intellectual property, oil and gas, land, nonbankruptcy debt collection, satellite orbits, spoils 
of war, treasure trove, and water rights. 
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land awards ownership to the first “discoverer” of unowned realty.
177
 
Similarly, the law awards ownership of abandoned property to the first 
person to take true possession of the item.
178
 
Yet, rules of capture are not universal. In many circumstances, the 
law prevents rapid assimilation of assets into private property, and 
instead limits the ability of potential owners to transform unowned 
assets into private property. For example, the various rules for estab-
lishing private property rights over unowned water generally forbid 
ownership to the first person to establish possession over any given 
waters. The English “natural flow” rule for surface waters forbids wa-
ter appropriation by upstream riparian landowners in any way that 
impairs the water’s “natural flow” unless the appropriation enjoys the 
assent of all downstream owners.
179
 The American “reasonable use” 
rule permits appropriation without such assent, but only to the extent of 
a reasonable riparian use for the upstream land.
180
 A competing Ameri-
can rule—the “Colorado” rule or “prior appropriation” rule—
privileges the first beneficial appropriation over other would-be ap-
propriators;
181
 this rule too, while bearing some resemblance to first 
possession doctrines, ultimately leaves some waters outside the private 
property system.
182
 
First appropriation of water is problematic given the general geo-
graphic location and movement of water. Stable patterns of consump-
tion would not be possible under a first appropriation rule, as no use 
would be entitled to legal protection until potential users reached con-
tractual agreements with all potential rival claimants. Absent such 
agreements, only waters actually reduced to possession would be owned. 
As a result, high transaction costs would bar efficient investments. Why 
                                                                                                                      
 177 One infamous application of this rule can be found in M’Intosh, 21 US at 595–96, 604–05, 
which ruled that Native Americans did not have true ownership of lands in the Americas and 
that the European nations could therefore establish ownership through “discovery.” 
 178 See, for example, Eads v Brazelton, 22 Ark 499, 499 (1861) (ruling that ownership over 
an abandoned shipwreck could be established by “occupation”—that is, actual salvage opera-
tions and not mere discovery of the wreck’s location—and that failure to reduce the wreck to 
possession defeated a claim of ownership). 
 179 See T.E. Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo L Rev 60, 
101–02 (1963) (discussing the English case of Wright v Howard, 57 Eng Rep 76 (Ch 1823), which 
introduced the “natural flow” theory, affirming the principle that each proprietor has equal rights to 
water usage and therefore no proprietor can use her right to the prejudice of any other). 
 180 See Evans v Merriweather, 4 Ill 492, 494 (1842) (“There may be, and there must be, of 
that which is common to all, a reasonable use. The true test of the principle and extent of the use 
is, whether it is to the injury of the other proprietors or not.”). 
 181 See, for example, Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Co, 6 Colo 443, 446 (1882). 
 182 A nonbeneficial use, for example, grants no appropriative rights; it is the style of appro-
priation rather than the actual capture that grants the rights. Thus, someone might draw from 
unclaimed waters but be forbidden to exercise property rights over them because they fall within 
the scope of the privileged appropriation. 
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invest in a water pump if only water actually pumped is protected and 
future upstream diversions cannot be prevented? 
Additionally, excessively rapid assimilation of some natural re-
sources could lead to a tragedy of the commons, involving overappro-
priation and wasteful use. This is due to the taker’s ability to internal-
ize the stream of benefits from a resource once it is reduced to prop-
erty, while paying only the direct cost of appropriation and a miniscule 
share of the loss to society as a result of the resource being removed 
from the commons and closed to others’ use. Only where transaction 
costs are sufficiently low (as in, for example, a small community with 
highly effective social norms) can the tragedy be avoided as every 
taker is forced or convinced (through side payments) to internalize a 
greater share of the societal cost.
183
 
Holding natural resources like water outside the ordinary appro-
priation rules keeps the Blackstonian property system away from a 
resource to which it is ill-suited but does so without changing the 
Blackstonian nature of property. Thus, once water is appropriated, 
under whatever rule, it is owned under precisely the same rule as any 
other property. This keeps water (once divided under special rules of 
appropriation) within standard asset-owner-dominion configurations. 
At the same time, the appropriation rules encourage appropriate in-
vestments and discourage tragedies of the commons. 
Other natural resources have also been placed outside the ordi-
nary capture rule. While oil and gas have been viewed as “fugitive re-
sources” and therefore logically analogous to wild animals subject to 
the capture rule, many states have adopted a different course. Modern 
rules prevent free and unlimited appropriation, and instead force poten-
tial claimants into common pools or restrict them to variations of reason-
able use.
184
 Arrangements of the latter type serve, like water rules, to pre-
serve standard Blackstonian property configurations for the resource 
once it is appropriated, but slow appropriation to take account of the size 
of the pool and the associated difficulties with free appropriation. 
Use of differential appropriation rules allows policymakers to 
distinguish between asset characteristics that are not a good fit for 
private property rights subject to other nonprivate property regimes, 
while retaining some degree of property treatment where appropriate. 
                                                                                                                      
 183 See generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action (Cambridge 1990) (criticizing assumptions underlying proposed solutions to 
the tragedy of the commons and exploring an alternative solution in which users self-organize 
and govern themselves in the long-term management of the common resources). 
 184 See generally Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 Harv L Rev 1155 
(1952) (discussing regulatory efforts in the oil and gas industry to prevent waste and improve 
recovery through prorationing, well-spacing, or compulsory pooling and unitization). 
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Asset characteristics that do not fit well with private property rights 
may be subjected to other nonprivate property regimes. Property 
treatment may be retained, nonetheless, where appropriate for other 
asset characteristics. Rather than forcing all assets into the Blacksto-
nian mold of a single owner, this strategy keeps certain assets out of 
the private property system and under common or public ownership 
until it makes economic sense to introduce private property rights in 
them or in certain aspects of them. 
IV.  THREE-DIMENSIONAL SOLUTIONS FOR PROPERTY PROBLEMS 
In this Part, we present some normative implications of our three-
dimensional property analysis. Specifically, we show how many prop-
erty dilemmas that have traditionally been resolved by one of the six 
strategies we outlined in the previous Part are actually amenable to 
resolution by more than one strategy. In addition, we show that some 
dilemmas not previously considered as amenable to resolution may be 
resolved by use of one or more of the six strategies. Finally, we look at 
some problems that have been created in defining property rights 
without due heed to a three-dimensional analysis and show how they 
may be resolved by using one or more of our six strategies. 
A. Tribal Land 
As discussed earlier, anticommons—excessive fragmentation of 
ownership shares among owners—characteristically plague some prop-
erty forms.
185
 One of the most prominent examples of an anticommons 
is provided by the land regime in Native American reservations. In a 
well-intentioned but misguided attempt to protect communal Native 
American lands in the late nineteenth century, Congress provided for 
the allocation of reservation lands among Native American house-
holds, with provisos severely limiting alienation of the parcels.
186
 Over 
the years, the lands became ever more divided among heirs and the 
parcels became increasingly fragmented to the point where some land 
interests produced a lease income of as little as a tiny fraction of one 
cent per month and much of the land lay fallow.
187
 In 1983, Congress 
                                                                                                                      
 185 See Part II.A. 
 186 See General Allotment Act, ch 119, 24 Stat 388 (1887), codified in various sections of 
title 25, repealed by the Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000 § 106(a), Pub L No 
106-462, 114 Stat 2007, codified in various sections of title 25. See also Act of March 2, 1889, ch 
405, 25 Stat 888 (authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation into 
separate reservations and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indi-
ans, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male Sioux).
 
 187 Hodel v Irving, 481 US 704, 708 (1987) (quoting legislative history on the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 1934). 
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passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act, which escheated small por-
tions of highly fractionated parcels to the tribe upon death of the 
owner. However, in Hodel v Irving,
188
 the Supreme Court ruled that 
the escheat worked an unconstitutional uncompensated taking.
189
 As 
Heller noted in criticizing the case, the result was that many Native 
American lands remained in an anticommons.
190
 
A three-dimensional analysis highlights the possibility of other 
strategies for combating anticommons. Reducing the number of own-
ers by eliminating the interests of holders of small portions of highly 
fractional parcels is not the only possible solution to the challenge of 
excessive fragmentation, nor is it necessarily the best one. Indeed, 
even after eliminating the claims of the smallest interest holders, the 
land would remain divided among multiple owners (albeit with some-
what greater interests). Hence, while clearing title of the smallest 
owners’ claims would likely prevent further deterioration into anti-
commons, it would not likely improve the alienability of the land or 
the cost of managing it to a significant extent. 
Our approach highlights the possibility of adjustments along the 
owner or dominion axes and thereby brings to light several strategies 
that could outperform the solution of forced forfeiture. For instance, 
policymakers could address the problem of excessive fragmentation of 
interests in tribal land by appointing a single fictional owner in the 
land, such as a tribal cooperative, with tribal member-owners exchang-
ing their undivided fractional interests in the land for shares in the 
cooperative. This solution respects all existing claims to the property 
while reducing the cost of managing the land. The owners would 
commute their veto powers for voting rights, and decisions about the 
use of the land would be made by the majority of the members. 
Alternatively, policymakers might consider making the land free-
ly alienable and use the strategy of formalizing limited nonpossessory 
tribal rights to protect traditional land uses. This approach would al-
low tribe members to transfer their land to nonmembers subject to a 
servitude that would run with the land and ensure that future owners 
do not use it in ways prejudicial to the tribal heritage. This would al-
low owners to escape the trap of passing along small, unusable shares 
by selling them to a buyer with a superior use. At the same time, the 
                                                                                                                      
 188 481 US 704 (1987). 
 189 See id at 716–18. See also Babbitt v Youpee, 519 US 234, 244 (1997) (ruling that Con-
gress’s effort to rehabilitate the Act by allowing a narrow class of individuals to receive frac-
tional interests did not cure the fatal flaw ruled unconstitutional in Irving). 
 190 See Heller, 108 Yale L J at 1217 (cited in note 11) (attacking the Hodel and Babbitt 
decisions rejecting private antifragmentation strategies as further perpetuating the tragedy of the 
anticommons). 
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nonpossessory interests retained by the tribe members would enable 
them to seek injunctive relief against future owners whose uses run 
afoul of tribal traditions. 
B. Conservation Commons 
The strategy of formalizing nonpossessory interests could im-
prove the management of natural resources. A three-dimensional ap-
proach demonstrates the possibility of creating useful new tools for 
achieving conservation of parks and open space. 
Parks generally do not fit well into private property regimes. 
Purely private parks are likely to be undersupplied as spillover bene-
fits to neighbors are extensive and transaction costs are high. Thus, 
many areas that would be socially optimal for use as parks will be 
used in some other manner that provides a higher return for the pri-
vate owner, even though the private use is inferior from a social wel-
fare point of view.
191
 Ordinary commons management of parks and 
open spaces is also problematic. Turning parks into public commons 
raises the specter of overexploitation.
192
 Without effective governance 
and enforcement mechanisms, common property regimes make it pos-
sible for members of the owners’ group to take full advantage of the 
resources without bearing the full cost of their actions.  
Generally, the real world solution for the failings of common and 
private property in this context is found along the ownership axis. 
Specifically, authorities usually keep parks and open space under gov-
ernment ownership. Unfortunately, this solution raises a few problems 
of its own. First, government actors often mismanage conservation 
properties. Government actors are imperfect agents of the public will, 
and they may find it advantageous to trade away the benefits of their 
power for personal gain. Thus, for example, they may collaborate with 
private developers to dispose of government property at submarket 
prices and encourage inefficient development on conservation prop-
erty.
193
 Additionally, decisionmakers may fall prey to fiscal illusion that 
leads them to fail to take account of public benefits or costs that do 
                                                                                                                      
 191 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Anti-property, 102 Mich 
L Rev 1, 2 (2003) (“Government actors often mismanage conservation properties, collaborating 
with private developers to dispose of government property at submarket prices and encouraging 
inefficient development on conservation property.”). 
 192 See Hardin, 162 Science at 1244 (cited in note 96). 
 193 Bell and Parchomovsky, 102 Mich L Rev at 2 (cited in note 191). To give one example, 
the federal Bureau of Land Management came under fire in a recent congressional report for its 
sale of seventy acres of Nevada land to a private developer for $763,000; the developer sold the 
land the next day for $4.6 million. See Joel Brinkley, A U.S. Agency Is Accused of Collusion in 
Land Deals, NY Times A16 (Oct 12, 2002). 
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not appear directly in the government budget.
194
 Together, these fac-
tors lead to a significant likelihood that conservation properties will 
be transferred to suboptimal development interests even when owned 
by the government.
195
 
A possible remedy to the problem of government mismanage-
ment of conservation properties is to divide the asset or dominion, 
rather than selecting a different single owner. As we have suggested 
elsewhere, lawmakers could provide for formalized nonpossessory 
rights—specifically, negative easements—in neighboring property 
owners.
196
 Formalizing the neighbors’ interests into formal negative 
easements would introduce a new element into conservation of the 
threatened land: a network of antidevelopment rights.
197
 The creation 
of a network of nonpossessory rights in neighboring property owners 
would not give them any special rights to use or possess conservation 
properties. Yet, it would give them veto power over the development 
of conservation properties, enabling them to seek legal remedy against 
development plans that did not get their blessing. Furthermore, the 
resulting network of negative easements in the hands of the neighbors 
could produce a regime in which it is practically impossible for un-
wanted development to threaten conservation of the defended prop-
erty. Developers who wish to develop the land would need to secure 
consent from all easement holders in a process that is notoriously sus-
ceptible to holdout problems and strategic bargaining.  
C. Access to Coastal Lands 
Property rights in beaches present a particularly nettlesome prob-
lem in many states. Generally, state law preserves the wet sand area 
(the strip of sand demarcated by the ebb and the flow of the tides) as 
public property while recognizing private property rights in the dry 
sand area.
198
 In many beaches, the general public cannot access the wet 
sands without crossing over private dry sands. States have resorted to 
various tactics in order to create or preserve access to the wet sands 
beaches. Courts in New Jersey invoked the public trust doctrine as 
grounds for creating easements by necessity over private beach proper-
                                                                                                                      
 194 Bell and Parchomovsky, 102 Mich L Rev at 17 (cited in note 191).  
 195 For examples, see id at 30–31 (listing four recent sales of undeveloped public lands in which 
conservation interests were systematically disadvantaged by the political decisionmaking process). 
 196 See id at 31–37 (proposing an “antiproperty easement” that vests in each property own-
er the right to veto any development in nearby green space).  
 197 Previously we have labeled those rights “antiproperty rights.” See id at 5. 
 198 See Rose, 53 U Chi L Rev at 713 (cited in note 86). Some states, most notably California, 
have extended the rights of the public “from the tidelands to the dry sand areas landward of the 
high-tide mark.” Id at 713–14. 
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ties for the benefit of the public.
199
 Specifically, the courts reasoned that 
the state’s duty under the public trust doctrine to preserve public beach 
access implied the existence of public easements over private lands as 
necessary to ensure access. Courts in California and Texas chose to rely 
on theories of prescriptive easements or implied dedication to secure 
access and use rights for the public.
200
 Finally, courts in Oregon, Florida, 
and Hawaii turned to a theory of custom to reach the same result.
201
 
The various approaches taken by the courts have one thing in 
common: they all focus on the dominion dimension. In all cases, courts 
recognized public access rights by narrowing the exclusion rights of 
beachfront property owners. Specifically, the courts interpreted the 
bundle of rights of beachfront owners as not including the right to 
exclude members of the general public seeking to reach the beach. 
A different solution to the problem of public access to beaches be-
comes apparent once the problem is analyzed along the asset dimen-
sion. An asset-oriented analysis suggests that the problem of public ac-
cess to beaches arises due to a suboptimal configuration of beachfront 
properties. The decision to create contiguous strips of private parcels 
effectively blocked the public from reaching the beach without trespass-
ing on private property. An optimal configuration of the wet sands 
beach asset would necessarily include a means of access. From an asset-
oriented perspective, it becomes apparent that the challenge of access 
to beaches presents a natural case for forced reconfiguration.  
A different configuration of private lots interspersed with gov-
ernment lots (or narrow government strips) could be a better solution 
to the problem. Initially, such a configuration could have been achieved 
if the government retained title in certain beachfront lots and granted 
the public a right of access across them. Today, such a configuration 
can be accomplished via government exercises of its eminent domain 
                                                                                                                      
 199 See generally, for example, Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Association, 471 A2d 355 
(NJ 1984) (finding that the public must be given both access to and use of the foreshore as well 
as privately owned dry sand areas “as reasonably necessary”). 
 200 See generally, for example, Gion v City of Santa Cruz, 465 P2d 50 (Cal 1970) (super-
seded by statute) (holding that an implied dedication of property rights to the public arose when 
the public has used the land for more than five years without permission or objection from pre-
vious owners); Seaway Co v Attorney General of Texas, 375 SW2d 923 (Tex Civ App 1964) (af-
firming the jury’s finding of an implied dedication of land to public use and of an easement by 
prescription over land that had been continuously and adversely used for over ten years). 
 201 See generally, for example, Thornton v Hay, 462 P2d 671 (Or 1969) (ruling that the pub-
lic’s use of the dry sand areas of the beach met all the elements of the custom doctrine: ancient, 
exercised without interruption, peaceable, reasonable, certain, obligatory, and not repugnant or 
inconsistent with any other law or custom); City of Daytona Beach v Tona-Rama, Inc, 294 S2d 73 
(Fla 1974) (subscribing to the customary rights doctrine but declining to find an easement by 
prescription because the public’s use of the property was in furtherance of, not against, the inter-
ests of the private landowner); County of Hawaii v Sotomura, 517 P2d 57 (Hawaii 1973) (recog-
nizing that the public’s long-standing use of the beach had ripened to a customary right). 
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power. Although this solution would initially impose a cost on the 
government, as it would require compensating aggrieved property 
owners, it might represent a long-term improvement for all parties 
involved. Private property owners would fare better under the pro-
posed solution because those property owners whose property will be 
taken would receive compensation. The public would benefit from 
clearer and more convenient access to the beach. The government 
may be better off in the long run because there might be fewer con-
flicts between owners of beachfront properties. 
D. Land Assembly 
Provision of infrastructure and public goods often requires the 
government to engage in land assembly. Whenever this need arises, 
there is a natural tendency to think about eminent domain. After all, it 
is the accepted lore among legal scholars that land assembly is the pa-
radigmatic situation in which the government ought to exercise its tak-
ings power.
202
 Consider, for example, a plan to run a railway through a 
mountain valley. Without eminent domain, a single holdout can stop the 
project. Eminent domain allows the government to get around the high 
transaction costs and holdouts inherent in this situation. 
Our three-dimensional analysis expands on the conventional 
analysis in two important respects. First, it complements the conven-
tional analysis by more precisely characterizing the assets that ought 
to be taken by eminent domain. Our contribution here is primarily 
descriptive; we summarize the purpose of some eminent domain doc-
trines and suggest how they may be best implemented. Second, our 
analysis challenges the conventional analysis by proposing alternative 
ways to carry out large-scale projects without resorting to eminent 
domain. We discuss these matters in order. 
Many commentators have noted that the construction of railroads 
and highways by the government necessitates exercises of eminent do-
main. Little attention, if any, has been paid to the important question of 
how much of the involved assets the government should take. From the 
government standpoint, the answer is clear. Since the government must 
pay compensation for the value of the taken property, it has an incen-
tive to take as little as possible. Thus, in order to minimize compensa-
tion payments, the government is likely to prefer to take an easement 
over taking title to part of the tract when possible.
203
 Likewise, when the 
                                                                                                                      
 202 See, for example, Posner, 119 Harv L Rev at 94 (cited in note 117) (discussing the need 
to assemble a large tract of land for the city’s redevelopment plan as a possible impetus for the 
exercise of eminent domain in Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469 (2005)).  
 203 See, for example, Preseault v United States, 100 F3d 1525, 1532 (Fed Cir 1996).  
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government decides to take title, it will be inclined to take title to part 
of a tract and not condemn the tract as a whole.
204
 
While dominion-oriented perspectives may favor such a “minimal-
ist” approach, as it represents the smallest possible incursion on the 
rights of owners, an asset-oriented perspective strongly militates against 
it. To illustrate, let us return to the railway example. In the nineteenth 
century, the government and private railroad companies acquired mul-
tiple easements over private properties in order to run railways through 
them. These were no ordinary easements. Rather, they were high-impact, 
durable easements that completely prevented the titleholder from 
using the part of her property burdened by the right-of-way.
205
 Effec-
tively, the taking of the easement deprived the owner of virtually the 
entire value of the affected part. Such takings, in other words, had the 
same effect as title transfers of a slice of the parcel. However, by tak-
ing an easement rather than full title to the slice, such takings led to 
distorted configurations of both the title and the easement. As the 
years passed, the economics of the railroad business changed dramati-
cally, leading to many lines becoming uneconomical. Yet, the existence 
of the easements encouraged the companies to maintain lines in subop-
timal situations, as abandonment of the line would lead to abandon-
ment of the realty. Only where the social loss exceeded substantial 
transaction costs would it be worthwhile for railroads to abandon the 
easement in exchange for an agreed-upon compensation. 
Additionally, even if the government were to take title over a 
portion of the parcel, running a railway through the middle of a tract 
could, in some cases, render the remainder virtually valueless. Accord-
ingly, in such cases, it is important for authorities to apply the strategy 
of forced aggregation and compel the government to take title to the 
whole lot. This suggestion is in marked contrast with the general prac-
tice of taking no more of an interest than narrowly necessary to ac-
complish the public purpose of the taking.
206
 
The second point we wish to make is that land assembly does not 
necessarily call for the use of eminent domain. Indeed, several of the 
                                                                                                                      
 204 Consider Ink v City of Canton, 212 NE2d 574, 579 (Ohio 1965). 
 205 Indeed, in Preseault, the government advanced the argument that “the general federal 
legislation providing for the Government’s control over interstate railroad operations as enacted 
and amended over the years had the effect of redefining the private property rights of these 
owners, leaving them without a compensable interest in the land.” 100 F3d at 1533.  
 206 See Hill v Western Vermont Railroad Co, 32 Vt 68, 76 (1859):  
In either mode of appropriating land for the purposes of the company, . . . there is this im-
plied limitation upon the power [of eminent domain], that the company will take only so 
much land or estate therein as is necessary for their public purposes. It does not seem to us 
to make much difference in regard to either the quantity or the estate, whether the price is 
fixed by the commissioners or by the parties.  
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strategies we discuss in Part III can be used instead of takings. As-
sume, for example, that the government needs to assemble a suffi-
ciently large parcel for a parking lot. The standard solution is to re-
place the multiple private owners of the relevant lots with a single gov-
ernment owner through the use of eminent domain. Importantly, the 
same result can be accomplished by alternative strategies as well. One 
such strategy is the creation of a fictional owner. For example, the gov-
ernment can force the relevant private owners to set up a corporation 
or a partnership and then transfer their lots to it in exchange for shares. 
A somewhat similar approach was taken by Michigan in the oil and gas 
industry. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality adopted 
a procedure to mandate compulsory pooling “whenever an owner de-
sires to develop his or her mineral rights, but cannot do so because the 
owner’s tract is smaller than the established drilling unit.”
207
 Amnon 
Lehavi and Amir Licht proposed an interesting variation on this strat-
egy in which land assembly for large-scale, for-profit development pro-
jects would be permitted only by means of a special-purpose develop-
ment corporation, which would, in turn, have to offer condemnees the 
option of compensation in corporate shares instead of cash.
208
 
As many commentators have noted, the strategy of imposing li-
mitations on owners’ ability to reconfigure their assets can also lead to 
outcomes that are just as valuable as land assembly for some purposes. 
An industrial park, for example, can be created by zoning changes 
rather than by land assembly through eminent domain. As part of its 
police power, the government can exert significant control over the 
development and use of property. The government can rezone proper-
ties to ensure that they would be put to the desired use, or employ 
more indirect incentives to induce property owners to carry out the 
government’s will. Naturally, it is possible to combine strategies in 
appropriate cases. 
E. Superfund 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act
209
 (CERCLA or “Superfund”) is one of the most just-
ly maligned pieces of environmental legislation ever adopted by Con-
                                                                                                                      
 207 James R. Neal, Compulsory Pooling Promotes Conservation of Michigan’s Oil and Gas 
Natural Resources, 78 Mich Bar J 158, 161 (1999) (defending Michigan’s compulsory pooling 
procedure as promoting a reasonable balance between conservation and development interests).  
 208 See Amnon Lehavi and Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 Colum L Rev 1704, 
1732 (2007). 
 209 Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (1980), codified as amended at 42 USC § 9601 et seq 
(2000) (creating a tax on the chemical and petroleum industries and providing broad federal 
authority to respond to the release or threatened release of hazardous waste). 
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gress. CERCLA was intended to clean up polluted land and prevent 
further contamination. In part, it did this by establishing guidelines for 
hazardous waste disposal, identifying “brownfields” (polluted par-
cels),
210
 creating a Superfund to pay for cleanup, and identifying a large 
class of jointly and severally liable “potential responsible parties” who 
would have to contribute to the cost of cleanup. The actual results of 
the legislation have been underwhelming. Most brownfields remain 
polluted more than twenty-five years after the establishment of Super-
fund.
211
 The Act’s assumed dichotomy of polluted and clean lands often 
requires excessive cleanup, while the multiplicity of liable parties and 
the enormous liability costs encourage excessive litigation.  
In a property rights analysis, CERCLA’s effect is to force the 
bundling of all brownfields with liability.
212
 Any potential purchaser of 
a polluted land parcel must automatically accept exposure to joint and 
several liability under CERCLA. This asset configuration can hardly 
be calculated to place brownfields under their most beneficial use. 
Survey data and scholarly literature emphasize that concern for future 
liability is a primary reason for brownfields remaining undeveloped.
213
 
And, indeed, there is little reason to suspect that an optimal developer 
of a brownfield will also be the optimal insurer of other parties’ 
CERCLA obligations. The result is a poorly configured asset compris-
ing land plus liability that is suboptimally exploited.
214
 
A three-dimensional perspective offers a number of possibilities 
for redressing this problem. The most straightforward means lie in the 
asset dimension. If owners of Superfund sites were able to sell the 
brownfields without the attached liability, the pool of potential users 
would expand without in any way diminishing the pool of liable par-
ties since all parties liable prior to the sale would maintain their status. 
Under current administrative practice, the EPA and states sometimes 
                                                                                                                      
 210 Subject to a handful of exceptions, CERCLA defines a brownfield as “real property, the 
expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential 
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.” 42 USC § 9601(39)(A). 
 211 For general information about Superfund, see EPA, CERCLA Overview (July 17, 2007), 
online at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (visited June 8, 2008). 
 212 See for example, Fenton D. Strickland, Note, Brownfield Remediated? How the Bona Fide 
Prospective Purchaser Exemption from CERCLA Liability and the Windfall Lien Inhibit Brown-
field Redevelopment, 38 Ind L Rev 789, 789 (2005) (noting that many brownfields lay deserted and 
undeveloped because developers fear the risk of liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA). 
 213 See generally Anna Alberini, et al, The Role of Liability, Regulation, and Economic 
Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Development: Evidence from Survey of Developers, 35 
Regional Sci and Urban Econ 327 (2005).  
 214 See generally Howard F. Chang and Hilary Sigman, The Effect of Joint and Several 
Liability under Superfund on Brownfields, 27 Intl Rev L & Econ 363 (2007) (using a model of 
joint and several liability to show how liability risks from Superfund discourage the purchase of 
brownfields and emphasizing the effects arising from the potential buildup of defendants). 
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attempt to imitate this asset division by issuing “prospective purchaser 
agreements” assuring would-be purchasers that the EPA will not im-
pose additional CERCLA responsibilities.
215
 Formalization of the asset 
division could enhance the marketability of brownfields. 
Less obviously, CERCLA could offer possibilities for immunity 
from liability while obtaining more limited rights. For example, 
CERCLA could offer greater immunity for many kinds of service 
providers and developers, permitting owners to subcontract for devel-
opment without expanding the liability pool. This would permit great-
er owner calibration of dominion and asset configuration in order to 
maximize the efficiency of brownfield use. 
F. Intellectual Property 
We illustrate the usefulness of the two final strategies—fictional 
assets and differential acquisition rules. Intellectual property embod-
ies an attempt to strike a balance between society’s desire to ensure 
adequate provision of intellectual goods and its interest in guarantee-
ing wide access to, and use of, the works once they have been pro-
duced. Intellectual property law strives to achieve this delicate balance 
by granting property protection to creators on the one hand, while im-
posing limits on the duration and scope of the rights on the other. Na-
turally, intellectual property law is not static. Rather, as we discussed 
in Part III.B, it is subject to constant adjustments and refinements. 
Recently, an increasing number of commentators have cautioned 
that in the last several decades intellectual property owners managed 
to augment their protection at the expense of the public. The natural 
reaction of intellectual property theorists was to propose narrowing 
the rights of intellectual property owners (and, correspondingly, ex-
panding those of the public).
216
 For the most part, these proposals fall 
under the category of formalization of nonpossessory property inter-
ests. For example, expansion of fair use rights
217
 does not seek to strip 
                                                                                                                      
 215 See generally id. See also Robert V. Percival, et al, Environmental Regulation: Law, 
Science, and Policy 269 (Aspen 4th ed 2003) (describing the EPA’s announcement in 1995 to 
promote the use of “comfort letters” for owners worried about continued CERCLA liability and, 
similarly, “prospective purchaser agreements” to assure potential buyers worried about future 
CERCLA liability); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, et al, Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and 
Society 1018 (Aspen 3d ed 2004). 
 216 See, for example, Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm 
for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 Or L Rev 647, 647–48 (2000) (noting the expansion of copy-
right holders’ rights at the expense of the public and seeking to arrest this trend by implementing 
principles of public trust to information).  
 217 For proposals of this kind, see, for example, Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman, 
Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va L Rev 1483, 1488 (2007) (proposing to expand fair use by formalizing 
fair use harbors that would supplement the current equitable analysis).  
File: 3 - Bell-Parchomovsky Final 0904 Created on: 9/4/2008 6:55:00 PM Last Printed: 10/1/2008 5:26:00 PM 
2008] Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions 1069 
the asset away from the copyright holder but rather to reduce the 
holders’ rights of exclusion. 
Assuming that the critics are correct about the deleterious expan-
sion of intellectual property rights, our analysis yields two interesting al-
ternatives. Instead of scaling back protection, lawmakers can: (1) change 
the definition of the protected asset; and/or (2) make it more difficult 
to acquire protection by changing the prerequisites for acquiring prop-
erty rights in intellectual goods. The first strategy is especially useful in 
the context of intellectual property. Intellectual goods are essentially 
fictional assets. For this reason, policymakers can redefine them with 
relative ease. Unlike a fox or other tangible assets, a copyright or a 
patent can be defined in many different ways. Current law illustrates 
this point. Copyright law affords protection to expression but not to 
the idea underlying it. Patent law, by contrast, does afford protection 
to the idea underlying an invention. Accordingly, if one believes that 
patent protection stifles competition in the product market, a possible 
solution may be to redefine the protected asset by excluding ideas 
from the scope of patent grants. A similar strategy may be applied to 
copyrights. For example, current copyright law protects, among many 
other works, compilations of preexisting public domain materials. Per 
our suggestion, policymakers could easily exclude such works from the 
definition of copyrightable subject matter.  
The second strategy takes a different tack. Indeed, there are al-
ready many crucial differences in the acquisition rules pertaining to 
different kinds of intellectual property. Patent protection can be ac-
quired only by securing approval from the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice after a fairly exacting review. Trademark law posts a much lower 
barrier: the use of a mark in commerce. Finally, copyright posts the 
lowest barrier of all: protection springs into existence when original 
expression is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. More impor-
tantly, the rules of acquisition change over time. For example, until the 
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976,
218
 publication—not fixation—
triggered copyright protection and unpublished works received no pro-
tection. International pressure prompted the US to drop the publica-
tion requirement and to settle for the much lower bar of fixation. In 
principle, however, the process is reversible. For example, if policy-
makers believe we have too many copyrights, they can address the 
problem by legislating stricter acquisition standards. For instance, in 
the context of copyright law, it is possible to substitute the lax original-
ity standard for a much stricter “considerable creativity” requirement. 
Similarly, in the context of patent law, it is possible to replace the non-
                                                                                                                      
 218 Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, codified as amended at 17 USC § 101 et seq (2000). 
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obviousness standard—which requires an invention to be nontrivial to 
a person skilled in the relevant art—with the more stringent “inven-
tive step” standard that is employed in Europe. Of course, the two 
strategies are not mutually exclusive and may easily be combined. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we demonstrated the importance of adopting a 
three-dimensional approach to property law and policy. This approach 
maintains that every property determination can be analyzed along 
the dimensions of number of owners, the extent of their rights, and 
asset configurations. Careful analysis of the interaction among these 
dimensions is the key to understanding the deep structure of property 
law. Since each of the dimensions often pulls in a different direction, 
property law developed various strategies to optimize among them. 
Property law, as seen from a three-dimensional perspective, is a deli-
cate balancing act that must often sacrifice one dimension for the sake 
of another.  
Understanding property in this way makes many ostensible doc-
trinal anomalies disappear. In addition to its explanatory power, our 
three-dimensional approach offers a wide array of policy responses to 
property challenges. It suggests that every property challenge may be 
addressed on any one of the three dimensions or by any combination 
thereof. Accordingly, policymakers always have more than one option 
available to them. At the same time, they must be aware that interven-
tion on one dimension will frequently lead to adjustments (or ten-
sions) along the other two.  
We also showed that that the three-dimensional view suggests a 
more nuanced evolutionary account of property rights. The inherent 
tension among the three dimensions causes property to be more shifty 
and ever-changing than is currently assumed. Understanding property 
law as a balancing act that spans three distinct, yet related, dimensions 
leads to a richer and more coherent view of the field. We hope that 
scholars and lawmakers will take advantage of this richness to tailor 
better solutions to current and future property problems. The message 
for policymakers is possibly even more valuable: every policy must be 
analyzed along all three dimensions. Intervention that does not take 
account of all three dimensions might often lead to unexpected ad-
verse consequences and may even prove counterproductive.  
 
